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PLAYING AROUND HART AND KELLER’S
FULL-COURT PRESS:
DESIGNING A FEDERAL COMPULSORY
LICENSING REGIME FOR RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
THAT ENABLES DEVELOPERS AND
COMPENSATES RIGHTS HOLDERS
WILL BUCHER
Two right of publicity cases concerning Electronic Arts’ NCAA
Football video game series, Hart and Keller, have held that those games
infringe the rights of publicity of the athletes they depict, effectively ending
the franchise. While both decisions featured a thoughtful dissent, neither
the majority nor minority opinions offered an interpretation of right of
publicity law that, in practice, results in athletes being paid for their
likeness. This article joins other scholars in concluding that a compulsory
licensing regime for rights of publicity would provide a way to remedy the
inconsistency between the effects of Hart and Keller and the historical and
economic underpinnings of right of publicity law. This article then
presents the first comprehensive proposal for what such a compulsory
licensing regime would look like. By examining existing compulsory
licensing regimes for other forms of intellectual property, assessing the
specific challenges that exist in adopting a similar regime in the context of
rights of publicity, and analyzing the effective compensation rates observed
in recent comparable transactions, this article presents a complete and
actionable structure for such a regime. Specifically, this article concludes
that an effective compulsory licensing regime for rights of publicity should:
allow, but not require, interactive entertainment developers to opt-in to the
system; make the system available only to works depicting more than forty
likenesses outside of a fixed narrative; provide an exemption for
organizations that successfully aggregate and license large numbers of
rights of publicity; fix compensation at 5% of gross revenue; and distribute
the collected funds through a flexible committee system.


Will Bucher graduated with honors from the University of Chicago School of Law in 2015 and
is currently an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton. The author would like to give special thanks
to Professor Randal Picker for his advice and guidance in the initial drafting of this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its final installment, Electronic Art’s (“EA”) video game series
NCAA Football sold nearly two million copies.1 Today, the series is
canceled. It was not canceled because it was unpopular or unprofitable.
Instead, it was canceled because two circuit court decisions—Hart and
Keller—leave EA and other video game developers with no feasible way to
make historically accurate simulations like NCAA Football without
violating right of publicity law.2 While the First Amendment protects most
expressive uses—even those uses that incorporate the image or likeness of
another person—the rulings in Hart and Keller held that the video games
were not sufficiently expressive or transformative to avoid running afoul of
right of publicity law absent licenses from the rights holders.3 Given the
sheer number of rights involved and the potential for opportunistic holdout
on the part of rights holders, this is a feat that can be accomplished only in
fiction. Whatever one might think of the legal analysis, the Hart and Keller
decisions represent a remedy that is worse than the disease, ensuring that
these simulations go unmade and, in turn, that rights holders go
uncompensated.4 This article explains how we got here: to a place where
all players lose, whether they are holding a controller or a ball. It also
suggests an immediate solution: a compulsory licensing regime that would
allow developers to make their games and allow compensation for depicted
persons’ rights of publicity.
Technological advancement often outpaces legal advancement. As
this article explains, there is no interpretation of existing right of publicity
law that allows for a disorganized, large group of individuals, like NCAA
athletes, to receive compensation for nontransformative depictions of their
1.
Game
Database:
Global
Sales
of
NCAA
Games,
http://www.vgchartz.com/gamedb/?name=NCAA [http://perma.cc/U2JX-ZQEU].

VGCHARTZ,

2. See generally Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
3. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1279 (“The district court was correct in
concluding that EA cannot prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense at
the anti-SLAPP stage.”); Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (applying the transformative use test and
determining that “while we recognize the creative energies necessary for crafting the various
elements of NCAA Football that are not tied directly to reality, we hold that they have no legal
significance in our instant decision”).
4. See generally Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42; Hart, 717 F.3d 141; In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268.
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likenesses in a video game or other work. To create a system that allows
both nontransformative simulation works to be created and rights holders to
be compensated, we must look towards old solutions and enact new laws.
The music and television industries have established compulsory licenses
to address similar market failures in the past, but to date, such licenses have
not touched rights of publicity. As new forms of entertainment—namely
nontransformative sports simulation games—test our understanding of the
right of publicity and its impact, a compulsory license system presents
itself as one solution to the problem. Establishing a compulsory license for
the rights of publicity brings new benefits and challenges: to be effective,
the system must account not only for the efficiencies it seeks to promote,
but also for the many opportunities for misuse that may come with it.
The bulk of this article sets about that task. It proposes a system that
limits the compulsory license for rights of publicity to works that depict a
large number of rights holders outside a set narrative. It also proposes a
system where licensing can continue as it does today where it has proven
feasible and where it falls short, to resort to a federal compulsory licensing
regime. This article recognizes that unlike other compulsory licensing
systems, there can be no one-size-fits-all model for distributing royalties
and thereby utilizes a committee system for making that determination.
This article considers the costs, benefits, and political implications of
different structural decisions. In doing so, it presents a full and functional
recommendation for a federal compulsory licensing regime for rights of
publicity.
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
This section introduces the history and the law surrounding rights of
publicity. First, this section provides a brief background on the emergence
of the right of publicity. Second, it details the decisions in Hart and Keller.
Rather than arguing that the decisions were or were not correctly decided,
this article points out that no matter the decision of the court, our legal
system leaves athletes without a feasible way to receive compensation for
their talent, ability, and publicity. Even assuming athletes are willing to
license their rights, drafting and negotiating thousands of separate licenses
is likely to be a prohibitive cost to developers. Third, this section discusses
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,5 the sole United States
5. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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Supreme Court case addressing the right of publicity.6 This article explains
why Zacchini provides little practical guidance to the courts in Hart and
Keller but argues that it does provide policymakers with a comprehensive
understanding of right of publicity values and what the right of publicity
intends to promote.
Finally, this section reviews the scholarship
surrounding the right of publicity, including scholarship calling for federal
reforms or advocates the enactment of a compulsory licensing regime.
A. The Emergence of the Right of Publicity
In jurisdictions where it exists, the right of publicity grants all persons
limited control over the use of their likeness even when their actions
intentionally place them in the public eye.7 By the middle of the 20th
century, courts had firmly established that individuals had some right to be
left alone—i.e., a right of privacy—although the bounds of that right were,
and still are, not clearly defined.8 One of the struggles that courts faced as
the right of privacy doctrine developed was whether and how privacy rights
applied to those who intentionally placed themselves in the spotlight.9
Because the traditional values underlying a right to privacy, such as
protecting the person from unwanted intrusion and disclosure, are greatly
diminished for those who voluntarily subject themselves to public
exposure, the initial reaction by courts was to suggest that no privacy rights
exist for public figures.10
In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank coined the term “right of publicity,”
6. The Supreme Court has only ever mentioned the right of publicity in two cases. The
other case, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, only mentions the right of publicity in a
parenthetical citing Zacchini. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
7. RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 22:32 (4th ed. 2010) (“By contrast, a right of publicity action is designed for
individuals who have placed themselves in the public eye. It secures for them the exclusive right
to exploit the commercial value that attaches to their identities by virtue of their celebrity.”).
8. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) (“The origins of the tort of invasion of
privacy lie in a famous article on The Right to Privacy published in 1890 by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis.”).
9. See THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, CAUSES OF ACTION FOR AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY § 121.2 (2016).
10. Id.; see O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1941); Pallas v.
Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Mich. 1952).
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thereby breaking away from the then-emerging jurisprudence limiting the
access of celebrities to privacy torts.11 Judge Frank distinguished the
dispute before him from other privacy rights cases, stating:
It is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.12
A year later, the first academic work on the right of publicity was
published.13 In the years to follow, academic literature began to formally
distinguish the right of publicity from traditional privacy torts.14
Jurisdictions that recognize both of these causes of action now distinguish
these rights.15 While the right of privacy protects against intrusion,
disclosure, and false light like any privacy action, the right of publicity also
protects against the misappropriation of a person’s image.16 With this
additional protection, many states established the right either by common
law or statute.17 Today, 29 states recognize the right in some form.18

11. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953); see also BOGGESS, supra note 9.
12. Haelan Laboratories, Inc., 202 F.2d at 868.
13. BOGGESS, supra note 9.
14. See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzeti Imp. & Exp., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“Although the right of publicity is an outgrowth of the right of privacy, the two rights
‘protect fundamentally different interests and must be analyzed separately.’”).
15. Id.
16. BOGGESS, supra note 9.
17. Id.
18. Id.

ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

2/9/2017 5:09 PM

PLAYING AROUND HART AND KELLER’S FULL-COURT PRESS

57

B. Recent Right of Publicity Litigation Surrounding the Use of NCAA
Athletes in Video Games
The past few years have seen a flurry of parallel litigation relating to
the use of NCAA athlete’s likenesses in video games. The federal circuits
decided three cases in 2013 regarding EA’s catalog of sports simulations,
which made unlicensed use of athlete’s likenesses.19 One case, Brown v.
Electronic Arts, Inc., was brought as a Lanham Act claim and was
dismissed.20 However, the other two cases were brought under a right of
publicity theory and were permitted to move forward by two-to-one
decisions in the Third and Ninth Circuits.21 As discussed further below, the
effect of these cases’ holdings is that under right of publicity law, game
developers must compensate current and former NCAA athletes for the use
of their likenesses in the creative works the developers produce at rates
individually negotiated with each and every person depicted.22
The Keller and Hart decisions both addressed whether the uses of the
individual athletes’ likenesses are protected by the First Amendment and
specifically, whether the transformative use test was met in regard to the
use of the likenesses in the work.23 The transformative use test, as applied
to right of publicity cases, allows the creator of a work to use another’s
likeness so long as he or she transforms it in a way that it becomes part of
his or her own expression.24 As phrased by the court in Hart (quoting the
Supreme Court of California), the critical question is “whether the product
19. See generally Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
20. See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1247–48.
21. See Elec. Arts Inc. v. Hart (Hart Dismissal), 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013), cert.
dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1276.
22. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 151; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1281.
23. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1281.
24. CALLMANN, supra note 7 (“The defendant is entitled to summary judgment upon a
showing that its work ‘adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
the first with new expression, meaning, or message,’ that it is ‘transformative.’”) (citing Kirby v.
Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006)).
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containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become
primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s
likeness.”25 The court in Keller concluded that in EA’s video games it did
not so transform the likeness, stating “EA’s use of Keller’s likeness does
not contain significant transformative elements such that EA is entitled to
the [transformative use First Amendment] defense.”26 The court in Hart
concluded the same, reasoning that “[t]he digital Ryan Hart does what the
actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital
recreations of college football stadiums, filled with all the trappings of a
college football game. This is not transformative [. . .].”27
While largely agreeing on the transformative use test’s applicability
and functioning, the dissenting judges found that the requirements of the
test had been met and the likenesses were sufficiently transformed.28 These
opinions noted that the entire work contained substantial transformative
elements. Both decisions made reference to the games’ “dynasty” and
“campus legend” modes, which allow the user to create a wholly fictional
character or coach and control that avatar’s career, effectively turning the
work into a historical fiction where the user’s fictional team faces the real
teams and players of the time period.29 The opinions also posited that a
rule that penalized realism and commercial success was essentially
penalizing the creators for their immense talent.30 As Judge Thomas noted
in Keller, “I would not punish EA for the realism of its games and for the
skill of the artists who created realistic settings for the football games.”31
Judge Ambro, too, was zealous in defending the right to turn a profit by
engaging in First Amendment activity: “The First Amendment extends
protection to biographies, documentaries, docudramas, and other
expressive works depicting real-life figures, whether the accounts are
factual or fictional.”32 He went on to note that under Brown, video games
25. Hart, 717 F.3d at 160.
26. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1276.
27. Hart, 717 F.3d at 166.
28. See id. at 175; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1289.
29. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 175; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1271–72.
30. Hart, 717 F.3d at 173; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1287.
31. Hart, 717 F.3d at 173; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1287.
32. Hart, 717 F.3d at 173.
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were entitled to the full-unbridled range of First Amendment protection.33
For these reasons and others, Judges Thomas and Ambro ultimately
concluded that while “the public’s perception of fairness” might suggest
otherwise, EA was entitled to First Amendment protection for their
accurate depictions of athletes in their games.34
This article does not take a position on the correctness of these rulings
under current law. Rather, it points out the stark choice these courts face
when choosing an interpretation of the law. If these courts had reached the
opposite result, they would have preserved the ability of innovative game
developers to create and sell games based on these current and former
teams and players. These games would be enjoyed by millions of fans and
possibly generate substantial revenue for the game developers. The
persons depicted—the athletes who put in the work and time to become
skilled athletes—however, would receive nothing.
Under the Ninth and Third Circuits’ rulings, however, game
developers are required to carefully consider whether their use of
historically accurate athletes’ likenesses in simulation sports games is
transformative enough to be protected under the First Amendment and, if it
is not, to locate, negotiate with, and pay for licenses from every rights
holder whose likeness they use in that historically accurate simulation.35
That task is practically impossible and it is far more likely that such games
will simply never be made. These games include thousands of players,
some of whom are alive, some of whom are dead and, of the deceased
players, some of whom do not have postmortem publicity rights and some
of whom who do, which are ultimately owned by heirs (knowingly or
unknowingly).36 Tracking all of these people down would be a logistical
challenge and a cost-prohibitive task.
Even then, players could
opportunistically holdout, demanding a large sum of money from

33. Id. at 173–74.
34. Id. at 171.
35. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1270–71 (acknowledging that video
games “are entitled to the full protections of the First Amendment” yet holding that certain
celebrity uses, like those in the NCAA series, could still be violations of rights of publicity);
Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 (adopting the transformative use test because it is “flexible” and delineating
no bright line rules for developers to follow in the future).
36. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (2d ed.
2016) (“About 20 states recognize a right of publicity in the identity of a deceased person.”).
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developers or requiring mechanics concessions (e.g., “my avatar must be
the fastest in the game”). For video games that aim to show the full,
historically accurate roster for every team, it would only require a few
similarly motivated players to destroy any hope of securing the rights
required for a game by holding out and demanding an unreasonably high
price or by refusing to license their rights entirely. The result would be that
game developers could no longer create these sorts of realistic simulations
and millions of consumers could no longer purchase a product they desire.
And the persons depicted, the athletes who put in the work and time to
become skilled athletes? They still receive nothing.
As discussed in greater detail in the next section, the purpose
underlying the right of publicity is to ensure that people are compensated,
not to limit what is published.37 Therefore, the economic and social failure
resulting from these legal decisions calls for a legislative solution.38 In
economic terms, the ruling could be described as Pareto pessimal, which is
to say it hurts one or more groups without helping anyone. Just as a Pareto
optimal improvement is always desirable, a Pareto pessimal one can never
be.39 But when viewed in regard to the fundamental values embodied in
the right of publicity, both the Third and Ninth Circuits’ majority positions
and those of their dissenting judges seem wrong. Neither interpretation
offered by either side accomplishes this result going forward.40 If right of
publicity statutes are “correctly” read as generating a dichotomous choice
of this nature, then the law needs to be amended to provide more options
for developers, athletes and judges alike.
Most people can agree that game developers should be able to create
37. Id.
38. While it is conceivable that future court decisions will remedy this problem, more
recent court decisions indicate that this is very unlikely. In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, litigation which was parallel to Hart and Keller in attacking the NCAA’s
amateurism rules on antitrust grounds, the district court ruled that universities had to allow
players to collect up to $5,000.00 a year in compensation for the use of their rights of publicity by
universities. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007−08 (N.D.
Cal. 2014). This opened the door for developers to obtain the necessary licenses through
universities, a somewhat less cumbersome process than going athlete by athlete. However, on
appeal, the Ninth Circuit overturned this part of the ruling, holding “the district court’s[] remedy,
allowing students to be paid cash compensation of up to $5,000 per year, was erroneous.”
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
39. See, e.g., id. at 1007–08.
40. See supra Section II.B (explaining why neither interpretation fosters a world in which
athletes receive compensation for their likenesses).

ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

2/9/2017 5:09 PM

PLAYING AROUND HART AND KELLER’S FULL-COURT PRESS

61

fun, innovative, and captivating games without being legally constrained in
such a way that makes doing so, as a practical matter, impossible. Most
people would also be comfortable providing athletes and other public
figures depicted in video games reasonable compensation for the use of
their name and likeness. Assuming these statements are both true, then the
relevant question is not “were Hart and Keller correctly decided?” but
instead, “how can we create a regime that satisfies both of these wishes
meaningfully and simultaneously?”
C. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. is the only United
States Supreme Court case addressing the right of publicity.41 Zacchini
considered whether a human cannonball performance by Zacchini could be
broadcast without a license by a local television station.42 The Supreme
Court of Ohio found that Zacchini’s “right of publicity” could not trump a
local television station’s right under the First Amendment to broadcast the
news, even if it showed footage of the entire fifteen-second act.43 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the First Amendment
did indeed bar the state of Ohio from limiting the use of the film for
journalistic purposes through its “right of publicity.” Based on this
procedural posture, the United States Supreme Court found that it did not.44
However, this “right of publicity” claim may have been better
handled under unfair competition law, where the right of producers to
protect the value of their performance by excluding third-party copying is,
and was at the time of the decision, firmly established.45 As various news
outlets noted in their amicus brief in support of rehearing en banc for the
EA right of publicity cases:
41. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 152 (“We begin our inquiry by looking at Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., the only Supreme Court case addressing the First Amendment in a
right of publicity context.”).
42. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 579.
45. See generally Nat’l Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Sw.
Broad. Co. v. Oil Ctr. Broad. Co., 210 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Pittsburgh Athletic Co.
v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
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[T]he Supreme Court’s rationale for protecting Zacchini’s
proprietary rights is clearly grounded in his role as the
producer of his show, not because his image appeared on
television. The Court emphasized that Zacchini was
entitled to the same basket of rights as other event
producers, including not only the right to license
broadcasting rights to his entire event, but also the right to
charge admission fees—something plainly only event
producers can do.46
Thus, Zacchini is best seen as a case maintaining the ability of those who
invest time in creating creative works and performances from having those
efforts copied wholesale, rather than one limiting the scope of the First
Amendment where a person’s right of publicity is involved. As the Court
stated:
It is evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that
petitioner’s state-law right of publicity would not serve to
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts
about petitioner’s act [but] the Constitution no more
prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate
petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it
would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a
copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner.47
The awkward procedural posture of Zacchini—coming to the United
States Supreme Court as a right of publicity claim48 rather than an unfair
competition claim—makes it a frustratingly poor case for deciding the
recent litigation surrounding the rights of NCAA athletes. However, from
a policymaker’s standpoint, it is quite useful in understanding the values
that underlie the right of publicity and in turn, provides guidance on what
46. Motion for Leave to File a Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing En
Banc by Advance Publications, et al. at 11, Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.
2015) (No. 12-15737).
47. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75.
48. Id. at 564–65.
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legislatures and judges should aim to achieve when drafting and
interpreting the right of publicity. Zacchini makes two critical points on
this matter: (1) the right of publicity protects similar interests as patent and
copyright law and (2) unlike the privacy torts that are the right of
publicity’s historic predecessors, the right of publicity does not shield a
person from publicity; instead, it promotes compensation for it.49
The Zacchini opinion makes multiple comparisons between the right
of publicity and other forms of intellectual property protection. It states:
“the State’s interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law.”50 Later, the Court goes on to state “[the] same
consideration[s] underlie [the right of publicity as] the patent and copyright
laws long enforced by this Court.”51 It is clear that the Zacchini Court felt
that the right of publicity was a closely analogous right with other
intellectual property protections and in part for this reason, found that the
First Amendment could not eviscerate this new right, at least in situations
where the plaintiff might well have brought the claim under a more
traditional intellectual property theory.52 As policymakers, this analogy
should be our first signpost on how to resolve the current conflict between
the creative rights of game developers and the publicity rights of famous
persons. The past three decades have shown a rapid legislative response to
the challenges faced in administering copyrights in a digital world.53
Organizations like the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (“ASCAP”) quickly, cheaply, and effectively collect and
distribute royalties to and from thousands of entities, allowing artists and
application developers alike to be compensated in the new media
landscape.54
Second, the opinion makes it clear that the right of publicity is meant
to promote, not inhibit, the public use of people’s images and likenesses.55
49. Id. at 576.
50. Id. at 573.
51. Id. at 576.
52. Id.
53. See generally 2015 Annual Report, ASCAP 1 (2015),
http://www.ascap.com/about/annualreport.aspx [http://perma.cc/7QJT-CZ9G].
54. See 2015 Annual Report, supra note 51 (noting that they collected over $1 billion in
revenue and have “one of the lowest overhead operating rates in the world at 12.3%”).
55. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
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The right of publicity was not established to protect a person from being
thrust into the public eye, “focusing [instead] on the right of the individual
to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting
feelings or reputation.”56 The court goes on to state matter-of-factly that
“[t]he rationale for” protecting the right of publicity “is the straightforward
one of preventing unjust enrichment [. . .].”57 In reference to Ohio’s
rationale for establishing the right in the first place, the Court summarizes
that “Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on
[both] a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested
in his act [and to] provide[] an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.”58
The court is clear that this is not a case about what a person can say; it is a
case about who they have to pay.59 Like all intellectual property, the right
of publicity aims to encourage the creation of valuable works, not
extinguish them.60
Both of these principles suggest that where the right of publicity
ceases to promote the creation of valuable speech—where, like in the Hart
and Keller decisions, the court’s holdings resulted in fewer profitable uses
of a person’s likeness—the right should be amended so that it properly
effectuates its goals. This article proposes such an amendment. It details
how a federal compulsory licensing regime for rights of publicity
(“FCLRRP”) would allow both developers and depicted persons to profit
from the use of their likenesses, an outcome that is functionally impossible
under both the prevailing and dissenting opinions in Hart and Keller.
D. Current Proposals to Modify the Right of Publicity System

56. Id. at 573 (The right of publicity tort was compared to the tort of “false light.” In
doing so, it reiterates the desire for publication. The Court states: “In ‘false light’ cases the only
way to protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter
while in ‘right of publicity’ cases, the only question is who gets to do the publishing.”).
57. Id. at 576.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th
Cir. 1997) (stating “the fundamental and complementary purposes of both the intellectual
property and antitrust laws, [is] to ‘encourag[e] innovation, industry and competition.’”) (citing
generally Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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Before addressing this article’s proposal, it is worth pausing to
consider those proposals found in other scholarship. The decisions in
Keller and Hart have sparked a moderate body of literature.61 Many of
these scholarly articles suggest using a federal regime to replace the ad hoc
state-level administration of rights of publicity.62 With a single notable
exception, these scholars suggest simply imposing either a speechprotective or celebrity-protective rule at the federal level, which provides
no better solution than the choices facing the judges in Hart and Keller.
On the speech-protective side, Alex Wyman suggests “we need a
federal right of publicity not just to clarify the mess of laws on the subject,
but also to restrain the right to prevent it from impinging on our
constitutional rights any further.”63 Jon M. Garon proposes a regime that
clearly defines video games out of the “commercial speech” category and
“then builds upon . . . existing regulatory framework[s]” such as the FCC
“to suggest a reformulation of publicity rights that are consistent with the
Constitution, the interests of the public, and the rights of individuals to
control their rights of publicity.”64 Susannah M. Rooney would create “[a]
federal right of publicity under the Lanham Act,” which both the text of her
article and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown suggest would mean that
game developers would be free to create games on the order of the NCAA
series without compensating players.65
Conversely, Talor Bearman believes “Congress needs to pass a rightof-publicity statute providing a comprehensive cause of action for all US
citizens” and thinks that the length of that right should mirror copyright
61. See Alex Wyman, Defining the Modern Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. REV. ENT. &
SPORTS L. 167, 175 (2014). See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY § 11:50 (2d ed. 2016); Lee Levine & Steven Wermiel, The Court and the
Cannonball: An Inside Look, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 607 (2016); Mark Conrad, A New First
Amendment Goal Line Defense—Stopping the Right of Publicity Defense, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
743 (2014).
62. See Conrad, supra note 61, at 743; Levine, supra note 61, at 607; Wyman, supra note
61, at 175. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 61.
63. Wyman, supra note 61, at 175.
64. Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First Amendment: Shaping the Contours of Commercial
Speech in Video Games, Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 607, 609 (2012).
65. Susannah M. Rooney, Note, Just Another Brown-Eyed Girl: Toward a Limited
Federal Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S.
CAL. L. REV. 921, 924 (2013).
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protections.66 Similarly, Alex J. Berger would unify, but not fundamentally
modify, the right of publicity under a federal regime that “would reinforce
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning pre-Keller.”67 Whichever side of the coin
these scholars fall on, their arguments, by and large, simply rehash those of
the attorneys in Hart and Keller. Federal reform is needed, but there is
little sense in asking our legislatures to simply pick a side in that false
dichotomy.
One pair of scholars, David Frankly and Adam Kuhn, appear to be
exceptional in their recognition of the problem, if perhaps a little too
ambitious in their solution. They astutely note that “[t]he current state of
the law contrives an artificial dichotomy—property vs. speech—in uses of
celebrity images that plainly fails to accommodate reality.”68 They go on
to propose that free speech jurisprudence shift, to allow for a form of ex
post judicial compulsory licensing, under which the Constitution
guaranteed all persons the right to use any person’s image, but might have
to pay a portion of the revenue as decided by the judge.69 They suggest that
“we must allow judges to honestly deal with the underlying economic
issues.”70
A wholesale overhaul of free speech jurisprudence to accommodate
the economic realities of the modern world is almost certainly a bridge too
far, but the basic premise of creating a system that, in a meaningful way,
allows for game developers to purchase the rights of publicity en masse
from rights holders for something approximating fair market value is spot
on. At its conception, the right of publicity was about ensuring
compensation,71 and a federal regime should be implemented to ensure that
purpose is effected.
While Frankly and Kuhn are the only scholars who have yet to
suggest any form of mandatory licensing for rights of publicity to remedy
66. Talor Bearman, Note, Intercepting Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need a
Federal Right of Publicity, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 85, 107 (2012).
67. Alex J. Berger, Note, Righting the Wrong of Publicity: A Novel Proposal for a
Uniform Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 845, 867 (2015).
68. David Frankly & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself in a World of Others: Towards a
Paid-for First Amendment, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 977, 981 (2014).
69. See id. at 979.
70. Id. at 1015.
71. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
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the tension created by Keller and Hart,72 scholarship contemplating the
possibility of a FCLRRP goes back to at least the late 1980s.73 Eugene
Salomon appears to be the first scholar to contemplate the use of a
compulsory licensing system as part of a federal right of publicity but
ultimately rejects it, in large part because of fears that a compulsory
scheme would prohibit exclusivity agreements necessary for rights holders
to obtain fair compensation.74 He suggests that rights of publicity should
always be licensed voluntarily but that to protect free speech, they should
only apply to commercial works.75 Presumably, he did not anticipate the
challenges courts in cases like Keller would face in distinguishing between
what was and what was not a commercial use.76
The suggestion of a FCLRRP reemerged in the early 1990s.77 Apart
from an article that mentions it in a single sentence as a possible solution to
right of publicity issues,78 the next scholar to tackle the issue was Pamela
Lynn Kunath. Kunath approached the issue from the perspective of using
computer-generated imagery to create realistic likenesses of famous
actors.79 While most of the work is dedicated to deciphering the issue
under the present legal framework, Kunath briefly suggests that
compulsory licensing may be a solution to the problem. 80 Like Salomon,
Kunath is concerned about balancing exclusivity rights with the ability of
creators to access a person’s image, wanting to ensure that compulsory

72. Frankly, supra note 68, at 997.
73. See generally J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The
Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987).
74. Id. at 1195.
75. Id. at 1194 (positing that “[t]he better solution is to grant the individual an exclusive
right within the limited sphere of commercial use”).
76. See generally Salomon, Jr., supra note 73 (All provided examples of commercial
works are classic advertisements).
77. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 240 (1993).
78. Id.
79. Pamela Lynn Kunath, Note & Comment, Lights, Camera, Animate!: The Right of
Publicity’s Effect on Computer-Animated Celebrities, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 870 (1996).
80. Id. at 903–04.
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licenses are not “glutting the market.”81 Kunath suggests solving this
problem by forcing the right holder to agree to a limited number of
contracts per year, although Kunath does not address what would happen if
agreements stalled or if there were fewer bidders than the mandated
minimum.82 Kunath also identifies the holdout problem inherent in rights
of publicity negotiations, stating that “[w]ithout compulsory licensing,
when celebrities are asked to license their likeness for use in narrative
works, they will inevitably and understandably attempt to get the most
money for their image, [but] will lack the foresight to see the ramifications
such stubbornness will have on the . . . system as a whole.”83
While none of these works go into detail about how a FCLRRP might
function, their discussion of the potential benefits and pitfalls of such a
system serve as the foundation for this article’s recommendations. Until
Hart and Keller, a FCLRRP remained necessary only in theory. But now
the problem is very real, jeopardizing games loved by millions of fans that
generate billions of dollars in revenue. The time has come to put theory
into practice.
III. COMPULSORY LICENSING IN THE UNITED STATES
Compulsory licensing systems to facilitate the efficient distribution of
intellectual property are established in at least four areas84 and can provide
guidance in crafting a FCLRRP. The current systems are notable in several
regards. First, they all cover the licensing of copyrighted material and all
but one concerns the copyrights of musical works.85 Second, they exhibit a
wide range of fee and distribution structures, suggesting that there is no

81. Id. at 904.
82. Id. (“Personalities will not be forced to accept every request, which could result in
glutting the market with their likeness; however, there will be a statutory minimum requirement
of acceptances.”).
83. Id. at 906.
84. See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for Making
and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2009); 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014);
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010).
85. 37 C.F.R. § 385; 17 U.S.C. § 111; 17 U.S.C. § 115.
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definitive method for administering such a system.86 These structures are
tailored to the particular intellectual property rights at issue. Indeed, even
within a given licensing regime, one sees a hybrid of statutory, regulatory,
judicial, and free market mechanisms for administering the compulsory
license. This section provides an overview of these compulsory licensing
regimes, while the next section highlights challenges that would be specific
to a compulsory license governing rights of publicity.
A. Musical Performance Rights
Among the various copyrights embedded in a musical work is a
song’s performance right, which covers the right to perform a work,
including broadcast performance.87 The right allows the holder to spin
tracks but does not cover outright sales of the song in tangible mediums,
such as in a CD.88 There is no statute that compels a right holder to license
the performance right in a musical work, but most rights holders are part of
a Performing Rights Organization89 which is bound by an antitrust consent
decree to license the catalog of songs it holds to a purchaser at a reasonable
price.90 In practice, entities like radio stations who wish to play a wide
variety of music can purchase a license from one or all of the three
Performing Rights Organizations which then allows them to play all the
musical works in that organization’s catalog.91
86. Compare Mechanical Rights Licensing (setting at a fixed fee), infra Section III.B,
with Digital Performance Rights Licensing (paying a statutorily mandated 50/50 split of revenues
to artists and rights holders), infra Section III.C.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2002).
88. Compare id., with 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2002).
89. While it is difficult to quantify the total pool of all “musicians” let alone “rights
holders,” there are nearly a million members in ASCAP and BMI, substantially more than the
number of persons the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates work full time in the “Musical Group
or Artist” and “Music Directors and Composers” employment categories. While there are many
retired and part-time musicians, the fact that PROs have more members than there are full time
musicians in the U.S. demonstrates the consensus that most musicians generating any sizable
revenue are members in a PRO. See Kristin Thomson, How Many Musicians Are There?, ARTIST
REVENUE STREAMS (June 15, 2012), http://money.futureofmusic.org/how-many-musicians-arethere/ [http://perma.cc/72AR-T8CA].
90. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 411395(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001).
91. Of the roughly 15,000 United States radio stations, more than 10,000 are members of
the Radio Music Licensing Committee, which negotiates rates for full-catalog licenses with the
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Performing Rights Organizations arose to meet a logistical need;92
gathering the necessary licenses from all rights-holders is a time consuming
and inefficient process. Performance Rights Organizations gather these
catalogs of music for licensors, allowing radio stations, cover bands, bars,
and nightclubs to interact with only a handful of organizations to obtain the
rights to play a wide range of songs.93 In turn, artists are motivated to join
Performing Rights Organizations as many licensors will only play and pay
for music that is available through a catalog license—and if his or her
music were played by a broadcaster, the artist would often lack the means
to police and enforce his or her rights.94 If an artist holds out, a licensee
will simply play other songs for which they can easily obtain the
performance rights.95 But while Performing Rights Organizations solve the
inefficiency that is inherent in the market for musical performance rights,
they create the danger of another: that they might exercise monopoly power
in distributing the rights.96
For this reason, Performing Rights
Organizations like ASCAP are subject to consent decrees that limit the
scope of their operations.97
First, while Performing Rights Organizations do not have statutorily
fixed rates and instead, rates are regularly negotiated, they are obligated to
offer their whole catalog to any purchaser for a price that is the same as

Performing Rights Organizations. See Our Mission, RADIO MUSIC LICENSE COMMITTEE (2010),
http://www.radiomlc.org/ [http://perma.cc/FA4D-RCN4]; Jennifer Waits, Number of Radio
Stations in the U.S. Grows this Quarter According to FCC, RADIO SURVIVOR (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.radiosurvivor.com/2015/10/14/number-of-radio-stations-in-the-u-s-grows-thisquarter-according-to-fcc/ [http://perma.cc/4ZT2-4CXA].
92. See Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and
Performing Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 332, 367 (1986).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 360−64.
95. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that
“because of the nature of its music service, [the online radio station] ha[s] more of an ability to
substitute one work for another than many other music services” and that unlike an on-demand
service, a radio station does not need “to play virtually any composition its listeners demand”).
96. See Richard Ergo, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable
Compromise, 258 DUKE L.J. 258, 260 (1959).
97. See generally United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No.
41-1395(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999. See also United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 426 F.3d 91,
93 (2d Cir. 2005).
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they charge other similarly situated licensors.98 For this reason, the
licenses are considered compulsory. Second, a Performing Rights
Organization cannot hold exclusive control over the songs in its catalog.99
The rights holder must remain free to license the performing rights to its
musical works on an individual basis.100 This limits the opportunities for
Performing Rights Organizations to exploit licensors, as a licensor finding
the price too high or only seeking the rights to a few songs can always set
about the task of gathering the needed licenses one by one from the rights
holders. Third, the Federal Register publishes price schedules so interested
parties can ensure they are getting similar rates as other purchasers and
purchasers who believe they are not receiving a rate that comparable
entities are receiving can litigate the matter in court.101 For licensees who
operate interactive streaming services, like Spotify, the rate for the
combined performance and mechanical license is set by statute.102 Subject
to these restrictions, Performing Rights Organizations remain free to
otherwise set rates as they see fit.103 This means rates can be—and are—
set based on a wide range of factors, including venue type, size of the
audience, and number of track “spins.”104
Performing Rights Organizations also remain largely free to
determine the most effective way to monitor the use of particular
performance rights, enforce those rights against unauthorized users, and set
distribution schedules for transferring royalties to its member rights
holders.105 These distribution schedules can be complex.106 For example,
98. Am. Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *3.
99. Id. at *4.
100. Id. at *3.
101. See, e.g., Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for Noncommercial
Broadcasting, 77 Fed. Reg. 24662, 24665 (proposed Apr. 25, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
381).
102. See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for
Making and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385.12 (2009).
103. See generally Am. Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999; 37 C.F.R. § 385.
104. See ASCAP Music License Agreements & Reporting Forms, ASCAP (2015),
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensefinder [http://perma.cc/QGH2-PGTG].
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also Am. Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at
*9–10.
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ASCAP determines the royalties paid to members based on factors
including the music’s role in the performance (background, promotional,
theme, etc.), the type of licensees using the music (radio, television, night
clubs), the time of day the music was performed, and whether the music
was performed enough times to be considered “premium.”107 Once
calculated, royalties exceeding $1 are direct-deposited into members’
accounts every quarter or for members opting to receive a live check, all
royalties reaching at least a $100 threshold are mailed to the member.108

B. Mechanical rights to a song or composition
Another compulsory licensing regime in the United States exists for
the mechanical rights to a song.109 In order to legally affix a song into a
recording, either analog or digital, an artist needs to secure the mechanical
rights to the music.110 When recording an original work that has not been
sold by the creator to a third-party, an artist will already possess the
mechanical rights to the music by virtue of owning the copyright to the
song.111 When a person wishes to sell or distribute copies of a work for
which he or she does not have the mechanical right, such as when a song
was written by a separate song writer or the artist is covering another’s
song and recording it, mechanical rights need to be obtained.112 Similar to
106. The current operative antitrust consent decrees for both ASCAP and BMI place
some broad restrictions on how rights are enforced and royalties are distributed. For example,
money is to be distributed “primarily on the basis of performances of its members’ works,”
although special awards can be granted to works that “have a unique prestige value.” See Am.
Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *9.
107. See ASCAP Payment System: Royalty Calculation, ASCAP (2015),
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/royalties.aspx [http://perma.cc/XRA7-UKUR].
108. See Direct Deposit and Royalty Thresholds, ASCAP (2015),
http://ascap.com/members/payment/payment.aspx [http://perma.cc/4SDW-53QK].
109. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2002).
110. Id. § 115 (2010); see also ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 8:6 (3d ed. 2015).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2002), invalidated by Nat’l Ass’n of Boards of Pharmacy v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 17 U.S.C. § 115.
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the regime for performance rights, the mechanical right to a musical work
can be obtained by individual negotiation with the rights holder, but there is
also a rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board that a rights holder is
statutorily required to accept.113 This rate is currently 9.10 cents per song
sold for songs under five minutes and twelve seconds, and an additional
1.75 cents a minute for longer works.114
Unlike performance rights, mechanical rates are universally
applicable to all entities seeking a license under the compulsory scheme.115
This means that unlike performance rights, the rates for mechanical rights
generate little if any litigation surrounding the reasonableness of charged
pricing.116 It also means that there is no flexibility with pricing based on
the type of use or the user’s business model.117 This tradeoff reflects the far
less diverse usage of mechanical licenses relative to performance
licenses.118 Mechanical rights are necessary to sell tracks of songs that
listeners can play on-demand.119 Whether the form is a digital or analog
copy, the basic use is the same: a user is selling a track.120 While the
business models for the companies that distribute music tracks are
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 115; see also Michael Simon, The Basics of Mechanical Licensing
from Harry Fox, ARTIST HOUSE MUSIC (July 12, 2007),
http://www.artistshousemusic.org/articles/the+basics+of+mechanical+licensing+from+harry+fox
[http://perma.cc/77PN-E5TZ].
114. See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for
Making and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385.3 (2009); see also Dale
Kawashima, An Overview of Mechanical Royalty Rates, SONGWRITER UNIVERSE,
http://www.songwriteruniverse.com/mechanical.html [http://perma.cc/67JM-Y8LC].
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1).
116. See generally Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9177, 2011 WL 856266
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011); In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317 (offering examples of
notable royalty rights litigation focused on performance rights rather than mechanical rights).
117. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 115.
118. See generally What is a Mechanical License?, HARRY FOX AGENCY (2015),
http://www.harryfox.com/license_music/what_is_mechanical_license.html [http://perma.cc/436S94QW].
119. See id. (“A mechanical license grants the rights to reproduce and distribute
copyrighted musical compositions (songs) on CDs, records, tapes, ringtones, permanent digital
downloads, interactive streams and other digital configurations supporting various business
models, including locker-based music services and bundled music offerings.”).
120. See id.
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undoubtedly variable, the basic function varies far less than in the case of
performance rights, which run the gamut from garage bands to national
radio broadcasters.121 There is also a greater similarity in the range of
profit per use in the case of mechanical rights. A track sold is a track sold
and any one sale is unlikely to be massive in absolute monetary terms
regardless of whether the distributor is a small start-up or a massive record
label.122 In contrast, a single use of a performance license could be a song
played to a bar with one customer or a national broadcast reaching millions
of people.123 The presence of a limited range of profitability per use in the
mechanical rights sphere makes a nonvariable rate a more sensible option
for a compulsory scheme, as compared to one for performance rights.

C. Digital Performance Rights for Sound Recordings
Since 1995, sound recording copyright owners (“SRCOs”) have held
a digital performance right in the broadcasting or other performance of that
sound recording apart from or in addition to the performance rights in the
same work.124 Conceptually, this can be thought of as a more precise form
of the performance right. Whereas the performance right covers any
performance or broadcast of a song, the sound recording copyright covers
the performance of a specific digital recording of a song.125 Like the
system for generally applicable performance rights, compulsory licensing
for sound recording performance rights is overseen by the copyright royalty
board, but on a day-to-day basis is negotiated through a separate
independent entity.126 Currently, there is a single organization that licenses
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., iTunes, APPLE INC. (2016), http://www.apple.com/itunes/music/
[http://perma.cc/NZF7-29XD] (featuring songs for as little as $0.00 to as much as $9.99).
123. See, e.g., Phil Gallo, MTV VMA Ratings: Biggest Audience Ever, BILLBOARD (Aug.
29, 2011), http://www.billboard.com/articles/photos/live/467676/mtv-vma-ratings-biggestaudience-ever [http://perma.cc/Z84V-KJSK].
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2010).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002).
126. See Commercial Webcaster (CRB), SOUNDEXCHANGE (2014),
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/commercial-webcastercrb/ [http://perma.cc/KNS8-MXRW].
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sound recording rights, collects the royalties for them, and distributes them
to the rights holders and artists. 127 This organization is SoundExchange.
SoundExchange’s current price structure is complicated, with
different policies based on broadcaster size and type.128 Licenses are a
combination of lump sum minimum fees, per-play fixed rates, and
percentage of gross revenue rates, making calculations of comparable
effective rates difficult.129 However, in 2015, Pureplay Webcasters were
charged a minimum of 25% of gross revenue130 and Small Webcasters were
charged a minimum of 10%.131 Because larger broadcasters are charged a
fixed per-play rate, a precise figure cannot be calculated for them.132
However, a recent court decision noted that Pandora pays over 50% of its
gross revenue to SoundExchange.133
Although SoundExchange has the authority to enter into individual
negotiations over rates and generally has the discretion to attempt to set
reasonable rates on its own, it lacks the power to determine how the
collected revenue is distributed.134 Under 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2),
SoundExchange is required to distribute its revenue according to a

127. Eduardo Loret de Mola, SoundExchange Explained, MUSIC BUSINESS JOURNAL
(Oct. 2015), http://www.thembj.org/2015/10/soundexchange-explained/ [http://perma.cc/PS2D7AWA] (“Currently, this organization is the sole entity entrusted by the Copyright Royalty Board
(which is appointed by the U.S. Library of Congress) with administering statutory license fees
paid by non-interactive digital radio services.”) (internal quotations omitted).
128. See 2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/serviceprovider/rates/ [http://perma.cc/3S9P-Z6DU].
129. See id.
130. See Pureplay Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/pureplay-webcaster/
[http://perma.cc/TY49-KSM7].
131. See Small Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE (2014),
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/smallwebcaster/ [http://perma.cc/Z5T7-Z2BU].
132. See Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/rates/commercial-webcaster
[http://perma.cc/EEN6-TA8E].
133. See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Pandora
pays over half of its revenue to record companies for their sound recording rights.”).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (2010).
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statutorily mandated formula.135
Specifically, after deducting
administrative expenses associated with monitoring, collecting, and
distributing sound recording royalties, 50% must be distributed to the rights
holder, 45% to the featured artists, and the remaining 5% placed in escrow
for distribution to nonfeatured artists and vocalists.136 There is no apparent
economic necessity for the mandated distribution structure, which is not
found in the licensing regimes enacted for performance and mechanical
rights. Likely, the mandate reflects Congress’s attempt to cater to the
popular belief that record labels extort artists,137 with the mandate thereby
ensuring that half of the revenue goes to the artists rather than the record
labels who generally hold the copyright in the sound recordings.
D. Cable Television Retransmission
In 1972, the United States established a compulsory licensing system
for the retransmission of television signals.138 At the time, there was a
growing trend of cable television providers retransmitting the signals of
broadcast television, often from stations that were outside the immediate
geographic location of the viewership.139 Initially, this move was not
viewed as harming copyright holders, as the retransmission expanded the
audience of the channel, which then allowed television providers to charge
higher rates for advertising.140 However, when the signals were viewed at
distant locations, local advertisers were unwilling to pay extra for these
views as they were outside the target market and moreover, cable television
increasingly generated revenue through subscription fees which were in
part driven by the availability of content provided by local broadcasters.141
135. Id. § 114(g)(2).
136. Id. § 114(g)(2)–(3).
137. See Michael Arrington, The Music Industry’s New Extortion
Scheme, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 27, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/03/27/the-music-industrysnew-extortion-scheme/ [http://perma.cc/L7N6-WN4D].
138. Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED.
COMM. L.J. 191, 199 (1990).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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While it would have been possible for the cable providers to individually
negotiate licenses for this content, Congress felt “it would be impractical
and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable
system.”142 For this reason, along with a fear that “big television networks”
would holdout or set an unfair price (along with the influence of related
lobbying from the cable industry), a compulsory system was established in
lieu of a purely free market approach to licensing.143
The rate charged for licensing the right to retransmit television
programming is set by statute and is subject to modification by the
Copyright Royalty Judges to account for inflation and changes in fees paid
for cable subscriptions.144 Fees paid by retransmitters vary based on
location of the originating station, whether it is network television or not,
and the overall revenue of the retransmitter.145 The fees charged on
network television are lower than those charged on local broadcast stations,
based on reasoning that network television, which attracts national
advertisers, is more likely to gain revenue as a result of the retransmission
than their local broadcast counterparts.146 Retransmitters also pay declining
rates as more content is retransmitted, thereby reflecting the declining
marginal value of additional content to the cable viewer.147 At this stage in
the licensing royalty process, rates do not reflect any indicator of actual
value added or viewership.148
The formula for imposing fees on retransmitters is complicated but
fixed as a portion of revenue.149 A cable service provider knows in
advance what portion of gross revenue it will have to pay based on what

142. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976).
143. Cate, supra note 138, at 203.
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1)(A) (2014); see also id. § 801(b)(2)(A) (2006).
145. See id. § 111(d)(1)(A); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:75
(2016).
146. Cate, supra note 138, at 207.
147. Id. at 208.
148. Id.
149. Id.

ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE)

78

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

2/9/2017 5:09 PM

[Vol. 37:1

stations, if any, it chooses to retransmit using the compulsory license.150 In
contrast, the mechanism for distributing the collected royalties is not only
more complicated but also subject to a more nuanced (and subjective)
valuation of the content that is provided by the original content providers.
Under the compulsory licensing scheme for cable television retransmission,
royalties are distributed as follows:
After deducting its reasonable costs incurred as a result of
administering the Statements of Account, the Copyright Office
deposits the balance in the United States Treasury, where it is
invested in interest-bearing U.S. securities for later distribution
by the Librarian of Congress.
The fees are distributed among the following copyright
owners: (1) those whose works were included in a nonnetwork
television program imported as a distant signal; (2) those
whose works were included in a secondary transmission
identified in a special statement of account filed pursuant to
Section 111(d)(1)(A); and (3) those whose works were
included in nonnetwork radio broadcasts and imported as
distant signals. Distribution is conducted in two phases. . . .
The first stage of the proceeding, called “Phase I,” is
conducted to determine the percentage of the funds to be
allocated among the various categories of copyrighted
programs retransmitted by cable operators [while] Phase II
determines the allocation of royalties among the individual
claimants within any given category.151
While rights holders are allowed and encouraged to reach an
agreement as to how the fees should be distributed in lieu of litigation, the
Copyright Royalty Board resolves the controversies that inevitably arise.152
While the Copyright Royalty Board is prone to find that genuine
controversies over royalty distribution exist, in practice, by Phase II, all
distribution is settled by private negotiation.153 In settling these disputes,
150. Id.
151. PATRY, supra note 145, at §§ 14:76–78.
152. Cate, supra note 138, at 209.
153. Id. at 210.
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the Copyright Royalty Board looks at a number of primary and secondary
criteria:
(1) [H]arm caused to copyright owners by cable transmissions
of copyrighted works; (2) benefit derived from the secondary
transmission of copyrighted works; and (3) marketplace value
of the copyrighted works that are transmitted. The secondary
criteria are: (1) the quality of the copyrighted works; and (2)
time-related considerations. According to the C[opyright
Royalty Board], the Tribunal’s underlying goal is “to simulate
market evaluation.”154
Resolving these issues often takes years and the result for the litigants
can be underwhelming. Cate notes that in the 1982 distribution, one
company sought to increase its $28.42 million payment; while ultimately
victorious, the increase amounted to only $70,000.155 Whatever the total
cost on courts and rights holders, the distribution of royalties for cable
television retransmission presents a less efficient system than those found
in the music industry, where royalties can be distributed according to an
established and existing structure. But this complication reflects the simple
reality that computing the value of a television channel is a substantially
more complicated process than computing the value of a song, and changes
in the value of a broadcast channel retransmission are not neatly captured
by changes in overall retransmission rates in the same way a change in the
value of a musical work is seen in a reduced number of “spins” or
reproductions. The fluid structure of cable retransmission’s compulsory
licensing regime is born of necessity, not convenience.
Yet despite criticism of the cable television’s compulsory license, the
inefficiency generated by the system does not appear to be one of them. In
his critique of the system, Cate notes the system is characterized by a
“fairly low administrative cost” relative to the size of the total fund.156 In a
United States Copyright Office report from 2008 which recommended
phasing out the outdated system, the authors noted that the regime “has
proven to be an efficient mechanism to clear copyrighted works[, but] at
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Cate, supra note 138, at 221.
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below-market rates.”157 The compulsory licensing regime for cable
television retransmission rights shows that even a flexible system can
generate gains in licensing efficiency, even if it does not also generate
gains in efficacy.
IV. CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING A LICENSING REGIME FOR RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY
As noted above, no scholar to date has laid out a complete or
comprehensive structure for a federal compulsory licensing regime for
rights of publicity FCLRRP and this is not without good reason.158
Creating a regime for rights of publicity implicates challenges unlike those
faced by existing statutory regimes. The business environment for
interactive entertainment, combined with the underlying nature of the right
of publicity, means that in implementing a FCLRRP, little can be copied
wholesale from existing regimes. Beyond the administrative burdens of
establishing a new compulsory system, challenges exist that, without
careful or creative design, threaten the viability of the entire regime. If
there is to be a genuine push for legislation establishing a FCLRRP that
addresses these challenges, they first need to be acknowledged. This
section highlights these novel challenges, explaining how they arise in the
context of a FCLRRP and why they are nonexistent or trivial in the
implementation of existing compulsory licensing regimes.
An effective FCLRRP will need to be designed to consider the
following: (1) rights of publicity generate greater holdout concerns than the
rights subject to existing compulsory regimes; (2) the value of a person’s
likeness is difficult to quantify; (3) use of regulated private entities such as
ASCAP is not feasible for rights of publicity; (4) the ability of rights
holders to enter into exclusive agreements has demonstrated value in the
interactive entertainment industry so any loss of this ability under a
FCLRRP may have negative impacts; and (5) the functional and profitable
aggregation and assignment of rights of publicity in the context of
professional sports means that any FCLRRP will need to be drafted to
leave these systems intact if the regime is to maintain its efficacy and
political viability. This article addresses each of these challenges.

157. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION &
REAUTHORIZATION ACT § 109 REPORT, Exec. Summary, at vii (2008).
158. See supra, Section II.D.
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A. The Existence and Ethics of Holding Out
To date, compulsory licensing regimes have addressed markets where
bargaining for, monitoring, and enforcing intellectual property rights would
be unduly burdensome. Whether it involves music licensing or television
transmission, it is the often-stated view that there are too many
stakeholders and too much content to allow prices to be set by the free
market through unwieldy individual bargaining.159 This feature exists for
attempts to license large quantities of rights of publicity as well.160 A video
game can include hundreds or even thousands of likenesses161 and the
process of approaching and negotiating with each individual rights holder
would be costly—likely prohibitively so. For this reason alone, a
compulsory regime for rights of publicity is sensible.
Rights of publicity pose a problem even greater than the inefficiencies
found in many intellectual property markets. For those seeking to create a
historically accurate simulation of the real world, a license for the entire set
of rights of publicity necessary for the game is not just desirable, it is
necessary. A game that is 90% accurate is substantially less valuable than
one that is 100% accurate. Unlike a DJ who can play other musicians who
are popular at the moment or play other music in the same genre if he or
she lacks access to some music, the creator of a historical simulation has no
substitute for the real thing. Spotify survived for years without the
Beatles,162 but an NCAA football game cannot survive without Derrick
159. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89; United States Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, Comments of Netflix, Inc. 1, 10 (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/20/307908.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z9QW-BWX4] (“Th[e] hypothetical competitive market for broadcast music
performance rights would involve transaction costs. That is, programming producers and
copyright owners would potentially have to expend time and/or money negotiating and then
paying the fees. These costs would likely be passed on to the downstream broadcasters, so that
the cost of programming would be increased to reflect both the value of the performance rights
conveyed by the copyright holders and the costs of acquiring those rights.”).
160. See generally id.
161. See generally Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with
Defendant Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (accepting allegation that the class
contained “over 100,000 individuals” in granting preliminary approval of the class action
settlement).
162. See Max Willens, The Beatles are Streaming Everywhere, but Spotify has the Most
to Gain, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/beatles-arestreaming-everywhere-spotify-has-most-gain-2238361 [http://perma.cc/K89N-G76S].
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Henry. As addressed in the above discussion of Hart and Keller, the
possibility of holdout eviscerates the ability for developers and other
creative artists to create historically accurate simulations in a way that is
simply not present in the music or cable television industry.163 Without a
compulsory regime, the last few rights holders can holdout in an effort to
exploit the creative artists out of additional compensation. This possibility,
when considered prior to work beginning on an interactive medium, will
likely deter developers from even attempting the process. For this reason,
the need for a compulsory license is far greater in the context of rights of
publicity than for other intellectual property rights.
This is unfortunate because from an ethical perspective, there is far
less reason to think such an outcome is tolerable than in the context of the
intellectual property rights governing creative works. When an artist writes
a song or a director films a movie, he or she is creating something new that
would not exist absent his or her active work and effort. If a rights holder
then chooses to keep that work private, there may be a loss of value, but
that loss is no greater than if the artist had not set about the task of creating
the work in the first place. There is no fear that the exercise of copyright to
withhold works from the general populace will ever leave us as a society
worse off than if the right had not been established since the creator always
has the option of simply not engaging in the creative enterprise in the first
place.
J. D. Salinger’s decision to keep his writings private is
disappointing, but it does not infringe on the ability of others to realize
their creative potential, engage in political discourse, or otherwise pursue
their lives as they choose.
Those who exercise their rights of publicity in a manner that prevents
others from creating historically accurate simulations are not withholding
something they have created: they are preventing others from creating. As
the majority in Hart acknowledges, the right to speak truths about
whomever and whatever a citizen desires is at the heart of the First
Amendment and our democracy.164 As described above, at its very
inception, the right of publicity distinguished itself from privacy rights in
that it was not meant to protect a person’s right to be left alone, it was
meant to protect a person’s right to receive compensation for his or her

163. See supra Section II.B.
164. “Freedom of expression is not only essential to check tyranny and foster selfgovernment but also intrinsic to individual liberty and dignity and instrumental in society’s search
for truth.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985)).
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fame and notoriety.165 There is no reason to believe that a system that
allows rights of publicity to be used as a shield, not from defamation or
degradation but from the discussion in its entirety, should be maintained.
While a person’s right to reject a bargain normally ensures a fair price is
reached in the free market, there is little reason to maintain it in the context
of rights of publicity where the right of refusal is used not to arrive at a fair
price, but to extort an unfair one.
A FCLRRP needs to be drafted with this in mind. Functionally and
morally, any FCLRRP that, like the regimes for music, allows rights
holders to opt out of the system entirely cannot be sustained. In designing
a FCLRRP, drafters need to ensure that any mechanisms aimed at
preserving or mimicking free market bargaining do not allow opportunities
for exploitive holdout to linger. A failure to do so means the FCLRRP will
fail to achieve its fundamental purpose.
B. Difficulty in Quantifying the Value of a Given Depiction or Likeness
To compensate someone fairly for the use of his or her property,
whether it is real or a legally established intellectual property right like the
right of publicity, the value of that right must be determined. In free
market exchanges, this is simple: the value of a good is what someone is
willing to pay for it. In a compulsory regime, however, the license is
mandatory, so one cannot simply look at the exchange price to determine
the property’s value, if there is even an existing exchange price to begin
with. This determination is all the more difficult where the acquired rights
are bundled intellectual property rather than a single right or work. While
Performing Rights Organizations like ASCAP rely primarily on free market
negotiations to settle on a fair price for their catalog of works, 166 there is no
equivalent mechanic for determining how that revenue should be
distributed among component rights holders. Instead, the organization
must look elsewhere to generate a fair distribution.
In music, there is a readily available metric to apportion value—track
listens.167 While the digital age gives us access to a wealth of music in a
165. See supra Section II.A.
166. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 411395(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001).
167. U.S. Radio Royalties, BMI (2016),
http://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/us_radio_royalties [http://perma.cc/8MA7-Q2TV].
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variety of genres, the function of listening to a track remains largely the
same whether one is listening to Prince or Phillip Glass. Regardless of
venue, music genre, or audience size, when people listen to music, they are
pretty much engaging in the exact same act. This makes track listens a
comparable metric across all musicians, which in turn makes it an effective
way of assigning value to the rights within a Performing Rights
Organization’s catalog. This is all the more true because, with rare
exceptions, people tend to listen to one track at a time, which ultimately
provides discrete units of measurement.168 There is also a strong indication
that a played track provides the highest value of any track in the
Performing Rights Organization’s catalog at the time it is played—
otherwise the user would simply have selected a more desirable song—
which means track listens are a great indicator of actual value to the
consumer.169 While a given customer may get more absolute value out of a
given song than another user, we know that each is getting the most value
at that moment in time relative to their other options. For this reason, a
distribution system based primarily on track listens is a sensible and
efficient way to distribute royalties in the music industry and indeed, we
see Performing Rights Organizations using precisely such a system.170
In video games, however, there is no such comparable metric. Unlike
in music, the process of playing one game is often radically different from
the next. Rather than presenting a continuous flow of information to a
single sense, as listening to a song does, a video game engages many senses
at a rate that is influenced, if not entirely controlled by, the user. What the
player sees and focuses on varies from user to user, and from play session
to play session. While data could be collected to document the amount of
time a given likeness appears on a player’s screen,171 such information
cannot be reflexively converted to a monetary value as in music. A given
screen may contain dozens or even hundreds of likenesses at a given time,
which will provide varying degrees of value to the player experience. For
example, a user playing a basketball game may mostly derive value out of
168. See Billboard 200 Makeover: Album Chart to Incorporate Streams and Track
Sales, BILLBOARD (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chartbeat/6320099/billboard-200-makeover-streams-digital-tracks [http://perma.cc/UJR6-Y5VU].
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., U.S. Radio Royalties, supra note 167.
171. See Extra Credits, Extra Credits: Metrics, YOUTUBE (May 10, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqGcXOksFGg [http://perma.cc/FTQ4-C5NA].
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being able to play as his favorite basketball player, even when he is
controlling that player’s other team members periodically throughout the
game. That consumer may find the game more authentic, and thus more
valuable, if the players on the sidelines are the team’s real life second
string, but the second string’s presence on the screen is unlikely to be as
valuable as the avatars controlled by the player, even if they occupy
comparable screen time. Thus, for the use of publicity rights in video
games, there is simply no common currency like in music.
This means that any FCLRRP will need to adopt a more nuanced
approach to determining value if it is going to do so fairly. As we see in
the system governing television retransmission rights,172 it is possible to
have a more nuanced, flexible approach to such determinations. However,
doing so adds cost, uncertainty, and arbitrary allocations. A well-designed
FCLRRP will need to create a system that efficiently determines the
relative value of licensed likenesses while also minimizing these pitfalls.
C. Inability to Establish Regulated Private Rights Aggregators
At first glance, it would appear the use of regulated private entities
like ASCAP to gather, negotiate, and license rights of publicity would be a
way to maintain free market mechanics in a FCLRRP and to duplicate
existing and successful systems. Certainly, the use of such entities in the
music industry has been successful.173 Moreover, professional sports
organizations already serve this function for the rights of publicity of their
players,174 so it would seem the market is already implementing these
mechanisms successfully. Unfortunately, a FCLRRP would face difficulty
in relying on a system of regulated aggregators as the primary or sole
method of pricing and distributing rights. The number of rights of publicity
is simply too massive and the variety and value of those rights too
divergent, for such a system to be functional in a FCLRRP. While many
different professionals contribute to different aspects of the musical
172. See supra Section III.D.
173. See About ASCAP, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about [http://perma.cc/FL35NHWW].
174. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EXHIBIT 10.3: NFL PLAYER CONTRACT FOR
ARIAN FOSTER § 4 (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1573683/000104746913009713/a2216998zex-10_3.htm
[http://perma.cc/G4R8-4M75].
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creation process and may end up holding different types of rights to the
music, as a group they are relatively small and share similar interests.175 In
contrast, a federal right of publicity statute would cover every United States
citizen—that is, nearly a thousand times the number of people whom
musical rights organizations like SoundExchange represent.176 If a single
organization established a license to all existing rights, it would have to
represent every United States citizen in at least twenty-nine different states.
A citizen’s right of publicity has a radically different value, in different
contexts, and many have no value at all.177 The administrative hassle of
creating a new organization that purports to represent them all would be
foolhardy in light of the sheer number of rights held and the fact that most
members would never have their likeness licensed or used.
The ability of organizations like ASCAP to function is further
supported by the fact that there is a natural incentive for music rights
holders to be members of those organizations. Without the monitoring
ability of a large organization, an individual rights holder would have
immense difficulty in tracking and policing the use of its music.178 And its
music might not be played at all, as a DJ could simply select a song in the
licensed catalog rather than play the music of a musician who chose not to
join.179 In this way, Performing Rights Organizations can be voluntary,
allowing musicians who want to exploit their rights through the free market
to do so, but also sustainable since, as a practical matter, membership in a
Performing Rights Organization is likely the financially best option for
most rights holders.
But licensing rights of publicity are more complicated. As addressed
above, a handful of rogue rights holders can destroy the commercial
175. SoundExchange represents a little over 100,000 rights holders. See Working with
SoundExchange, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/SX-Infographic_as-of-2.13.151.jpg [http://perma.cc/7UMR-V39Z].
176. Id.
177. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67
U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 226–30 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of valuing an individual’s name or
likeness in comparison to valuing a celebrity’s name or likeness).
178. See Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and
Performing Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 332, 367 (1986).
179. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Because of the
nature of its music service, [an online radio station] ha[s] an ability to substitute one work for
another than many other music services.”).
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viability of a video game—and the value of any catalog license possessed
by the aggregator—in a way that the withdrawal of a rogue musician from
a Performing Rights Organization simply cannot. Whereas a musical
performing rights holder has an individual interest in joining a Performing
Rights Organization, an individual right of publicity holder has an interest
in abstaining from membership and holding out. As noted above,
eliminating the holdout problem is necessarily one of the core functions of
a FCLRRP. For this reason, unlike in the case of music, any ASCAP
equivalent would have to have mandatory membership, which in turn
introduces the administrative difficulties inherent in such a gigantic
organization.
This does not mean that private aggregators cannot have a place in a
well-designed FCLRRP. Where an organization can gather the complete
set of rights needed to create a historically accurate simulation or other
nontransformative creative work, there is no reason to prevent that from
occurring. Currently, organizations like the NFL already assemble the
publicity rights of their players and negotiate with developers to reach a
fair market rate.180 But these organizations cannot be relied on as the
principal method for operating the FCLRRP. If a regime is to be effective
in solving the holdout problem, then a FCLRRP must have some
mechanism of compelling every rights holder to license their rights, not just
those who choose to cede their rights of publicity to an aggregator.

D. Benefits of Exclusive Licensing in the Interactive Entertainment Industry
Among the benefits preserved by the ability of a rights holder to
abstain from licensing found in the free market and in compulsory systems,
like that for performance rights, is the possibility that a rights holder may
grant a licensee exclusive rights to the property in question. This
exclusivity provides additional value to the licensee, as it can be the only
product in the market offering a product with likeness features or with that
likeness endorsing the product in question. When compared with a system

180. See Brian Mazique, Building the Perfect Football Game to Coexist with ‘Madden’,
FORBES (Mar. 4, 2016, 9:53 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianmazique/2016/03/04/building-the-perfect-football-game-tocoexist-with-madden/#2140da837d30 [http://perma.cc/2E5M-2AD2] (discussing the NFL’s
exclusive license with Electronic Arts for the “Madden” series, as well as the pros and cons of
that licensing relationship).
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where anyone is statutorily permitted to license a work, exclusivity
provides consumers a benefit as well. If there is only one such product in
the marketplace, the consumer avoids confusion over which it is they want
or which is endorsed by the rights holder. An unchecked, unlimited
compulsory licensing regime for all rights of publicity could lead to a
market where consumers could not distinguish which games or other works
are worthwhile, which could ultimately jeopardize the entire industry.
Under a simple or underdeveloped compulsory regime, we can imagine a
world where every year there are fifty NFL simulation games, leading
consumers to buy inferior products not endorsed or sanctioned by the NFL.
This concern is particularly prevalent in the video game industry,
which experienced a massive crash in 1983 as a result of out of control
branding and a lack of product control. The leading game system at the
time, Atari 2600, did not have a mechanism for excluding unauthorized
games from use.181 The business model at the time was not substantially
hurt by third-party developers creating content for the platform, just as the
television industry is not hurt by the generation of TV shows, movies, and
consoles that utilize them. But without the ability to exclude low-quality or
nonfunctioning games, these third-party products diminished the perceived
quality of the system.182
Two additional factors exacerbated this problem. First, at the time,
parents who—without a source of trustworthy reviews like the Internet—
often lacked knowledge of which games were high- or low-quality,
primarily purchased video games.183 This allowed poor quality titles to
generate revenue from purchases by unsophisticated buyers rather than
being driven out of the market. Second, at the time, most companies
viewed video games as a way to make a small amount of extra profit
through licensing or even as commercials themselves, not as a method of

181. Ryan Lambie, The 1983 Videogame Crash: What Went Wrong, and Could it Happen
Again?, DEN OF GEEK! (Feb. 19, 2013, 7:01 AM), http://www.denofgeek.com/games/24531/the1983-videogame-crash-what-went-wrong-and-could-it-happen-again#ixzz3wb4VTBo
[http://perma.cc/55HR-PKGZ].
182. See id.
183. See The Great Video Game Crash of 1983, TV TROPES,
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/UsefulNotes/TheGreatVideoGameCrashOf1983?from=M
ain.TheGreatVideoGameCrashOf1983 [http://perma.cc/5W6V-AUAT]; Nadia Oxford, Ten Facts
About the Great Video Game Crash of ’83, IGN (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.ign.com/articles/2011/09/21/ten-facts-about-the-great-video-game-crash-of83?page=1 [http://perma.cc/8CEJ-KZFV].
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building or sustaining a related but separate core brand.184 For this reason,
many companies were willing to license their brands and trademarks with
no oversight into the quality of the final product—leading to such colossal
failures as the “E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial” game, most copies of which
were ultimately buried in the Mojave Desert.185 The end result was
massive distrust in the market as a whole, which lead to a 97% drop in
console profits over a one-year period and caused industry valuation to
plummet from $3 billion to just $100 million.186 This may be why
Salomon, writing just four years after the video game market crash of 1983,
cites a concern that a FCLRRP might limit exclusivity rights when
ultimately rejecting the suggestion as a viable solution.187
While not dispositive, Salomon’s concern is valid. Exclusive
agreements are one way in which the industry maintains control on quality
and establishes confidence in consumers. But there are reasons to think
that a lack of exclusivity for rights of publicity would have little impact in
today’s environment. Today’s purchasers of video games are on average
older and more sophisticated than the purchasers in 1983 and they have
easy access to online reviews which can help them assess which games to
buy and which to avoid. More importantly, rights of publicity are not
trademarked rights, which can be used to distinguish which products are
and are not officially licensed by the professional athletic organizations that
sponsor them.188 Even under a regime that opts not to carve out an
exception for organizations like the NFL, developers seeking to create a
professional football simulation would be unable to use the NFL or NFL
team logos in advertising or in-game, consequently making purchasers
aware that, regardless of the persons being depicted on screen, the game is
not an official NFL game. While the business environment in 1983 saw the
rampant and unchecked licensing of brands that were attached to inferior
products, most businesses no longer see video game licensing as a side
184. See Mark Rochester, The Video Game Market Crash of 1983, REAXXION (Nov.
19, 2014), http://www.reaxxion.com/1364/the-video-game-market-crash-of-1983
[http://perma.cc/V5WS-PUGL].
185. Lambie, supra note 181.
186. Id.
187. See J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a
Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1197–98 (1987) (“A compulsory license could
diminish [monetary] returns because an individual could no longer insure a user of exclusivity.”).
188. Id.
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business without repercussions on the core brand.189 It was this perception,
not the inability to exercise exclusivity, which led to many failures in 1983.
This does not mean that these concerns or the desires of rights
holders for exclusivity should be ignored. There are definite advantages to
providing a mechanism by which rights can be assigned in an exclusive
manner, including ensuring fair pricing and preventing consumer
confusion. To the extent possible, a FCLRRP should be designed to
facilitate exclusive or quasi-exclusive dealings in rights of publicity.
E. Presence of Functional Rights Aggregation and Allocation in
Professional Sports
The problems that are currently presented by rights of publicity are
both serious and real. The Hart and Keller decisions represent the death of
games that generated billions.190 Despite the burdens of the system, in the
context of professional athletics, the system functions quite well, delivering
titles like NBA 2K14 and Madden NFL 25 to millions of customers.191
Because these entities are able to implement uniform take-it-or-leave-it
contracts with their players, they are able to aggregate their players’ rights
of publicity and sell them to game developers like EA and Take-Two
Interactive.192 In order to prevent a FCLRRP from potentially disturbing
this currently functional system, a FCLRRP should either provide a
mechanism for these functional systems to continue or be careful to ensure
that whatever system replaces the current free market negotiations is both
as functional and as fair as what currently exists. A FCLRRP that creates
efficiencies in some markets while destroying them in others may not be
desirable. Pragmatism suggests that, at the very least, a FCLRRP should
generate gains in efficiency elsewhere that offset any losses in the rights
allocation that currently exists in professional athletics, if the FCLRRP
even touches these systems at all.

189. See generally Chad Hadzinsky, A Look Into the Industry of Video Games Past,
Present, and Yet to Come, CMC SENIOR THESES (2014),
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/842 [http://perma.cc/7CM9-43HE].
190. Global Weekly Chart, VGCHARTZ (Mar. 21, 2015),
http://www.vgchartz.com/weekly/42085/Global/ [http://perma.cc/NX3S-58Q3].
191. Id.
192. See Mazique, supra note 180.
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Preserving the status quo where it is currently functional is not only
justified on precautionary or utilitarian grounds: it is a political imperative.
The enactment of a FCLRRP would require an act of Congress—a
legislative body which in recent history has been less than prolific in its
enactment of laws.193 As discussed above, a FCLRRP would generate
value for developers and rights holders alike as it would facilitate works
that, under current legal theories and frameworks, simply cannot legally
and profitably be produced. But the perception that professional athletic
organizations might lose money or control in the process could easily
torpedo any chance the act had to be enacted. Justifiably, these
organizations will argue that, for them, there is no market failure, and will
therefore likely lobby against any regime that jeopardizes their profit from
these enterprises. If a proposal for a FCLRRP is to ever leave the pages of
academic journals and make it onto the president’s desk, it must provide
assurances to those with a vested interest that their current arrangements
will not be jeopardized.
V. THE PROPOSAL
This article proposes the creation of a Federal Compulsory Licensing
Regime for Rights of Publicity (“FCLRRP”). A FCLRRP would allow
creators to obtain a compulsory license covering the likenesses depicted in
nontransformative works such as simulation sports games, preempting any
state level right of publicity laws that might otherwise expose the creator to
liability for the depictions in the work. This is not a novel idea as the
United States already provides for compulsory licensing for musical works
and multiple scholars have proposed such a regime for rights of
publicity.194 But to date, these proposals have been rudimentary. This
section synthesizes these works with the concerns highlighted by the Hart
and Keller decisions—the precedent set by existing compulsory regimes
and other areas of the law—and the observed free market transactions for
rights of publicity to generate a concrete, actionable proposal.
The proposed design reflects both a desire for flexibility and fairness,
as well as the functional and political realities that accompany both
193. See generally Drew DeSilver, Congress Still on Track to be Among the Least
Productive in Recent History, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/23/congress-still-on-track-to-be-among-leastproductive-in-recent-history/ [http://perma.cc/43Z8-3XVC].
194. See supra Sections II.D, III.A–D.
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enacting and enforcing a compulsory regime of this nature. The proposed
FCLRRP favors free market outcomes where possible, and attempts to
emulate them where they do not exist. It is designed to limit opportunities
for parties to collude, holdout, or otherwise distort the market. It seeks to
preserve the status quo where it is functional while also providing a
meaningful alternative where it is not functional. Most importantly, it is a
complete, concrete proposal. Every element of the system, and the
rationale behind it, is detailed such that Congress could both quickly draft a
bill enacting the proposal wholesale and thoughtfully consider, debate, and
amend any portion of it.
The proposed FCLRRP creates an opt-in regime whereby developers
of qualifying nontransformative simulation games who cannot obtain the
needed rights of publicity through numerous individual negotiations can
elect to use a compulsory license. Developers opting in will have their
application published in the Federal Register. After a comment period,
allowing other parties to identify defects in the work’s eligibility, the work
will obtain a compulsory license. The price of this license will be set by
statute at 5% of the work’s gross revenue. These fees would be placed in
escrow until they reach a minimum threshold, at which point the
distribution process would begin. Because works will use depictions in
differing ways, a committee will design an individualized distribution
structure for the fees generated by each work. The proposed distribution
schedule will be published in the Federal Register before approval, giving
rights holders an opportunity to object much as they do in class actions if
they do not find it satisfactory. Once the Copyright Royalty Board
approves a distribution schedule, the funds will be distributed to rights
holders in accordance with its terms. The rest of this section discusses all
these elements in substantial detail.
A. An Opt-In Regime for Works Which Do Not Qualify for First
Amendment Protection
The proposed FCLRRP would be an opt-in regime under which the
developer or artist of a work could opt to follow certain procedures to
obtain compulsory licensing for his or her work. While this article has
focused primarily on the inefficiencies generated by the Hart and Keller
rulings, which held that EA’s video games were not protected as
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transformative works,195 all video games receive First Amendment
protection196 and for most such works, this means licensing simply is not
necessary. Entirely fictitious works do not implicate right of publicity law
at all. But even those who recreate the image or likeness of another are
often protected because their depictions are part of a transformative work,
fall under the fair use doctrine, or are a parody of the person depicted.
These works can continue to rely on these defenses as they have in the past.
An opt-in system also means that for developers who can obtain
licenses through traditional means, there is no disruption to their business
operations. This greatly reduces the downside risk of the system, as it
ensures that where the commercial licensing of rights of publicity currently
exists, it will continue to exist in the future.
B. Protections Associated With Opting Into a Federal Compulsory
Licensing Regime for Rights of Publicity
Before understanding how a FCLRRP would function, it is best to
understand what protections a developer of a game or other creative work
would receive by opting into the system. The background section of this
article has explained how, at least under the majority’s interpretation in
Hart and Keller, state-level rights of publicity severely hinder the ability of
developers to create works using the likenesses of real persons. A
compulsory license under a FCLRRP would provide a way for these
developers to license en masse the rights of publicity from the persons
whose images it used under certain defined circumstances, greatly reducing
their liability from right of publicity suits. Specifically, a FCLRRP would
provide that:
The developer of a qualified creative work may acquire a compulsory
license for the rights of publicity of persons depicted in that work, and no
right of publicity or comparable claim shall be maintained against that
developer regarding that work’s depictions of persons listed in the
developer’s completed and approved application for such compulsory
license, so long as the developer has otherwise fulfilled its obligations
under this statute.
This rule would function in a fairly straightforward manner: rights of
publicity would be licensed by a compulsory regime and any efforts to use
195. Elec. Arts Inc. v. Hart (Hart Dismissal), 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013), cert.
dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014). See generally Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).
196. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 787 (2011).
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state-level rights of publicity laws to bring a claim would be preempted.
But it is worth commenting on some of the details of the regime. First, the
regime only allows for compulsory licensing for “qualified works.” These
qualifications mean that the legal landscape remains mostly unchanged. As
is detailed below, this means that current games that function under
licenses from professional athletic organizations like the NFL will be
largely unaffected, although the FCLRRP would allow for such games to
expand their scope, say by including historical teams. Second, the
proposed act only limits claims based on that work’s depictions of persons.
If the developer uses a person’s likeness for advertising or endorsement
purposes, even for a work licensed under the FCLRRP, they will have to
seek licenses from the individual rights holders or else face liability. Third,
this act does not prohibit such actions if the developer fails, through
negligence or fraud, to fulfill its obligations under this statute. Hopefully
such instances will be rare, but the ability of individuals to bring lawsuits in
such instances heavily encourages a developer to dutifully carry out its
responsibilities. With these caveats in mind, we turn to the first matter:
which works should qualify for compulsory licenses under a FCLRRP?
C. Works Eligible to Receive a Compulsory License Under a Federal
Compulsory Right of Publicity Licensing Regime
This article, and other contemporary scholarship, has been triggered
by the decisions in Hart and Keller. Naturally, this means that the
depictions of current and former athletes in video games present
themselves as prototypical examples of the types of works that should be
covered. But beyond this, deciding on the bounds of a FCLRRP requires
balancing considerations that favor both broad and narrow application. On
one hand, constraining the scope of the FCLRRP means that as new
technologies emerge, they may unintentionally be left out of the law’s
protections, slowing growth and necessitating additional legislative action.
On the other hand, providing broad applicability risks the act altering the
current legal landscape in an unintended way. Moreover, while both video
game developers and rights of publicity holders stand to gain from a system
that authorizes games like EA’s NCAA Football series, this may not be true
for the economic ecosystems of other works. For example, if the rights of
publicity for actors could be licensed under an FCLRRP, actors might stand
to lose substantial revenue and would, in turn, oppose the act’s passage.
Expanding the scope of the act also means expanding the scope of those
who might oppose it.
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For these reasons, this article proposes defining qualified works as:
an audiovisual work (1) depicting persons from two or more U.S. states (2)
whose rights of publicity are owned or have been assigned to at least forty
separate entities other than the developer (3) which does not depict the
applicable likenesses as part of a set narrative.
As discussed below, the forty-entities requirement limits the FCLRRP
to developers who would face genuine hurdles in attempting to license all
the rights separately, the minimal diversity requirement helps ensure
constitutionality, and the lack of set narrative requirements preserves the
political viability of the act by not disrupting the established, functional
industries for television and motion pictures. These requirements were also
drafted with the understanding that many FCLRRP applications will be
approved ex parte. While applications for compulsory licenses will be
listed in the Federal Register and may be opposed by a party who believes
the requirements of the FCLRRP have not been met, often the Copyright
Royalty Board will have to decide on its own accord whether the work
meets the requirements. To facilitate this, the requirements were drafted to
be as objective as possible. When considered along with all the checks and
balances embodied in the FCLRRP this article proposes, these
requirements ensure that the system is not unfairly used to bypass fair
market dealings.
1. Use of rights of publicity that are owned or have been assigned to at least
forty separate entities other than the developer.
Because the need for an FCLRRP is generated in large part by the
complexities of attempting to individually license a large number of rights
of publicity, a qualification based on the number of rights holders would be
desirable. Of course, one could imagine a FCLRRP that allowed for a
developer of any copyrightable work to obtain a compulsory license for the
right of publicity of any individual or set of individuals. Such a regime
might well be functional, but it would be tantamount to government ratesetting for such rights. The impetus for a FCLRRP is not that markets have
been setting a rate that is too high or low, but that the market has not, and
cannot, set rates where the number of parties is too numerous and the risk
of a holdout is too high. In instances where the market can still reasonably
function, for example where a developer seeks a license for the depiction of
a single person, the FCLRRP should not allow developers to circumvent
the market. Conversely, creative works, like those that triggered the
lawsuits in Keller and Hart, would require obtaining licenses from
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thousands or tens of thousands197 of individual players and are therefore
prime candidates for such a license.
Determining where the line is between licensing obligations that can
be reasonably obtained through the market and those that require resort to a
compulsory system is a difficult, and in some sense arbitrary, task.
However, as addressed above, to qualify for the right to obtain a
compulsory option, a copyrightable work must depict the likenesses of
persons whose rights of publicity are owned or have been assigned to at
least forty entities other than the developer. This figure identifies situations
in which licensing the rights through traditional negotiations with all
parties is truly a monumental task and comports with current legal
jurisprudence concerning numerosity.
Since holdout problems can exist with as few as two rights holders, a
person could reasonably argue that simply requiring the presence of
multiple rights holders would be sufficient to identify situations in need of
a compulsory system.198 But doing so ignores the reality that deals can be,
and are, regularly negotiated under circumstances when multiple parties
hold rights necessary for the purchaser to move forward. Rather than set
the threshold at the minimum justifiable level, it is better to turn to an area
where our legal system already makes determinations about how large a
group must be to make assembling their individual rights impractical—that
area would be class actions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) directs courts to certify classes
only when they are “so numerous that joinder of class members is
impracticable.”199 Courts have developed a large body of law determining
precisely how numerous a group must be.200 These cases have set the
197. See Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with
Defendant Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (accepting allegation that class
contained “over 100,000 individuals” in granting preliminary approval of the class action
settlement).
198. For example, two people might own two adjacent lots that a real estate developer
needs to construct a shopping center. If the developer were to purchase one lot, the owner of the
other lot gains substantial leverage if he were to refuse the sale entirely.
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
200. See Jeffrey S. Gutman, Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys § 7.2,
SARGENT SHRIVER NATIONAL CENTER ON POVERTY LAW (2016),
http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/42#14 [http://perma.cc/K4L2-YESU]; see also Gen. Tel.
Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) (suggesting fifteen is too few); Hayes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 2013) (presuming numerosity at forty); Consol. Rail
Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (presuming numerosity at forty).
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precedent that, in general, classes under fifteen parties are too small and
that classes greater than forty parties are sufficiently large.201 There are
exceptions, of course, but as a general rule, if a class is larger than forty
parties, it will satisfy Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement.202 Given that
there are far fewer holdout concerns for joinder between plaintiffs when a
tort has damaged them all, it is sensible to assume that if forty parties are
too many, it would also be too many parties to practically negotiate
individual licenses with.
And lest one think the analogy improper, it is worth noting that the
similarities between right of publicity negotiations and class actions are
stronger than they might seem at a glance. In the case of a right of
publicity licensing, the developer seeks to gather rights held by numerous
entities so that it can generate substantial value—value that cannot be
generated by securing rights for only one or a few individuals. In the case
of a legal harm against a large number of people, an attorney seeks to
gather the claims so that he or she can generate substantial value from a
lawsuit, value that cannot be generated by one or a few individuals.203 Both
the developer and the attorney have a legal means of facilitating these
outcomes without resorting to specialty law; they can license each right
individually or seek the voluntary joinder of all class members respectively.
However, at a certain point, our legal system deems the effort required by a
class action attorney to gather all those legal claims in a single place too
costly and inefficient. At that point, the law allows for the compulsory
joinder of all stakeholders.204 This article proposes allowing developers,
under similarly numerous circumstances, to do the same.
While the case law on class actions suggests that requiring forty
entities is at the higher end of the legally recognized size at which
individual collection of rights is deemed impractical,205 the comparable

201. See Gutman, supra note 200; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 330
(suggesting fifteen is too few); Hayes, 725 F.3d at 357 (presuming numerosity at forty); Consol.
Rail Corp., 47 F.3d at 483 (presuming numerosity at forty).
202. See Gutman, supra note 200; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at
330; Hayes, 725 F.3d at 357; Consol. Rail Corp., 47 F.3d at 483.
203. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (allowing for class certification when “the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”).
204. See id.
205. Gutman, supra note 200.
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requirement in a FCLRRP is further checked by the ability of rights holders
to gather their rights together to disqualify a work from the compulsory
licensing system. The forty-entities requirement is about the number of
entities who hold the rights, not who generated them. This means that if
all, or all but thirty-eight, rights-holders can sell their rights to, or agree to
collectively bargain as a member of a single entity, then the compulsory
system does not apply. This further helps preserve the free market as the
preferred method of rights transfers in the United States and ensures
compulsory licenses will only be granted in situations where there are too
many parties for negotiation to be practical. The purpose of a federal
regime is to prevent the expense of locating all the rights holders and to
eliminate the possibility of a holdout. If the rights holders can gather
together themselves, much of this task is already accomplished.
2. Presence of minimal diversity.
The FCLRRP would also draw on another requirement from the Class
Action Fairness Act: minimal diversity.206 The legislation would deny a
work protection under the FCLRRP if all the persons who were depicted in
the work resided in the same state. Unlike the forty-entity requirement, this
requirement mostly exists to protect the constitutionality of the legislation.
While modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence gives the federal
government wide latitude to pass statutes,207 adding a minimal diversity
requirement means that every compulsory license will affect entities in
multiple states and thus be firmly within the sphere of interstate commerce.
It also allows states who have opted to favor free speech by not enacting a
right of publicity statute to promote the use of their citizens and locations in
creative works developed in their state. For example, a video game
developer creating a crime drama set in a modern-day West Coast city
might opt to locate their headquarters and game in Portland rather than
Seattle or Los Angeles so that they could depict real people in that city
without being subject to any licensing requirements.208

206. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2011).
207. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 112 (1942).
208. See Statutes & Interactive Map, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY,
http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes [http://perma.cc/4R99-5R6Q] (demonstrating that while both
California and Washington have right of publicity statutes, Oregon does not).

ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

2/9/2017 5:09 PM

PLAYING AROUND HART AND KELLER’S FULL-COURT PRESS

99

3. Not applicable to depictions used in a set narrative.
This requirement is meant to limit the scope of works covered so that
developers do not use the FCLRRP in instances where its application
would be inequitable. There is a risk that a developer might attempt to
acquire the rights of publicity for an individual by including forty other
parties and using the compulsory regime to circumvent fair market
negotiations. To borrow an example from Kunath, imagine a developer
with advanced CGI capabilities who creates a film starring “Katharine
Hepburn twenty years younger.”209 Hepburn is thrilled at the proposal to
create the film, but demands a large sum for her right of publicity. Finding
the price too high, the developer decides to place fifty other famous people,
from various U.S. states, in various minor roles throughout the movie; it
then applies for a compulsory license at the default rate. This sort of
creative endeavor, which uses numerosity to circumvent fair market
dealings for rights of publicity, is not the type of work a FCLRRP would
want to promote.
Deciding where to circumscribe the bounds in this regard—where to
draw the line between fairly using the system to create products that would
otherwise be impossible to license and exploiting it—requires an
understanding why the above example seems like an exploitation. It is not
because movies should not be covered. Video games hold no special or
diminished place in the pantheon of creative expression.210 It is unfair
because (1) the market sets a higher price for the use of a person’s image
when they are used in a set narrative work; (2) holdout problems are
substantially less likely to exist when casting a set narrative work; and (3)
set narrative works are more likely to draw on a few prominent depictions
disproportionately.
While there is no standard budget for casting in set narrative works,
there is at least anecdotal evidence that the cost for publicity rights is much
higher than that calculated for rights of publicity discussed later in this

209. Kunath, supra note 79, at 866.
210. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011) (“Whatever the
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ when a new
and different medium for communication appears.”).
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article.211 For example, the producers of Unbreakable dedicated $35
million—out of a $74.2 million budget—to the cost of the cast.212 The film
grossed $248 million worldwide, implying a rate equivalent to 14.1% of
gross revenue—a figure nearly three times the default rate for the proposed
FCLRRP.213
Whatever the cost of obtaining the rights of publicity, works with a
set narrative also do not suffer from the holdout concerns faced in creating
a historically accurate simulation. While not all narrative works have a
single prominent figure, almost all have less than a few dozen characters of
note. The FCLRRP is supposed to resolve the practical difficulties that
emerge from needing to license a large number of specific people. For
example, an accurate simulation of NCAA football requires complete and
accurate team rosters from every team depicted. If Slippery Rock’s left
tackle will not sign a deal, you can no longer have a completely accurate
simulation. But when expressing a set narrative, specific persons are rarely
required so holdout problems disappear. What if Slippery Rock’s left
tackle will not agree to be depicted in a story about a Division II team
being transferred to Division I and winning the National Championship?
The developer can solve this problem by going to Shippensburg or any
other Division II team and make the pitch. There is no need for a
compulsory licensing regime.
Finally, creative works with set narratives tend to draw on the persons
depicted in an intentionally disparate manner. The leads get by far the
most screen time while extras are used only once. While a FCLRRP
committee is designed to be flexible, constructing a fair distribution when a
few people occupy the vast majority of the work would be more difficult
than when avatar presence is more evenly spread. Likely, any distribution
would leave either the “stars” or the “extras” feeling undercompensated—
compounding the compensation issue addressed above. In short, works
depicting set narratives neither need nor benefit from inclusion in a
compulsory license system so they should be excluded from its scope.
None of this is to suggest that qualified works cannot or will not have
powerful narratives. The limitation is only on the use of compulsory
211. Hollywood by the Numbers: Unbreakable, THE SMOKING GUN (Apr. 14, 2000),
http://web.archive.org/web/20060905202743/http://www.thesmokinggun.com/hollywood/hollyw
oodsides/willisunbreakable1.html [http://perma.cc/54KB-C7X3].
212. Id.
213. Unbreakable, BOX OFFICE MOJO,
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=unbreakable.htm [http://perma.cc/GG9B-KN6Y].
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licenses for the individuals depicted in set narratives. This in no way limits
the powerful emergent narratives generated by the player’s interaction with
the game or other qualified work. When the player is guiding and
generating that narrative by contributing their own actions, the FCLRRP
still allows for likenesses to be licensed through its compulsory structure so
long as the developer does not orchestrate the narrative to achieve a certain
predetermined end or a small set of possible ends.
Even if a developer would like to express a set narrative as part of a
greater simulation, he or she may do so by obtaining individual licenses
from the persons depicted in the narrative and licensing all other likenesses
through the compulsory system. If a developer wants to create a NCAA
football simulation but also have a story mode for that Division II underdog
story, it can get the necessary licenses for the set narrative elements from
the individuals while using the FCLRRP for every other NCAA player.
Alternatively, if the set narrative the developer wishes to tell is
transformative and it is willing to risk the litigation, the developer need not
acquire licenses at all and can instead utilize the First Amendment
protection for transformative uses of celebrities’ likenesses.
As discussed above, because of the possibility of ex parte approval of
a FCLRRP application by the Copyright Review Board, the qualifications
for approval are ideally as objective as possible. While the diversity and
numerosity requirements are purely objective, determining whether a game
depicts listed persons in a set narrative will be a somewhat subjective task.
The Copyright Royalty Board is unlikely to need to go on a fact-finding
mission to make this determination however. Developers must already
prepare “a DVD that captures all pertinent content, including typical
gameplay, missions, and cut scenes” for the ESRB rating board.214 This
same content can be provided to the Copyright Royalty Board (under seal)
as evidence of the lack of set narrative. Further, as discussed in the
previous section, if a developer fails to fulfill his or her obligations under
the FCLRRP, an adversely affected rights holder may still sue him or her.
Thus, even if the Copyright Royalty Board ends up functioning as a de
facto rubberstamp, consequently finding all applications lack a set
narrative, there is still a strong incentive for the developer to comply.
D. Exemption for Qualifying Organizations That Aggregate a Substantial
Number of Rights of Publicity

214. See ESRB Ratings Process, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD,
http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratings_process.jsp [http://perma.cc/6Q47-4KXS].
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For the reasons discussed at length above, the compulsory system is
designed with an eye towards achieving both fairness and efficiency.
Whether these aims are actualized or not by any implementation of the
proposed FCLRRP, its enactment is neither desirable nor feasible if the
system does not preserve the functional exchanges made by professional
athletic leagues. To that end, this article proposes carving out an
exemption for certain qualified organizations applicable to both existing
organizations that successfully aggregate rights of publicity and similarly
functional organizations that might arise in the future. Such organizations
would have to meet three qualifications to be exempt from the compulsory
system: (1) they must gather a large number of rights; (2) they must be
registered to give developers notice that the rights they possess are not
subject to compulsory licensing; and (3) they must be actively engaged in
the commercial sale of the rights they have aggregated.
1. Large.
The core motivations behind the compulsory system are reducing the
cost developer’s burden of gathering rights one-by-one and eliminating the
ability of a single rights holder to hold up a developer by refusing to sell a
single likeness necessary to complete a set of rights needed for an
historically accurate simulation. If organizations were permitted to exclude
themselves from the FCLRRP with only a handful of rights of publicity,
rights holders would easily circumvent the system. The successful
licensing seen with professional athletic organizations is in large part due to
the fact that these organizations hold a large number of rights, usually the
complete set of rights necessary for a developer to produce a game in a
given genre.215 In order for aggregating organizations to be similarly
successful, they must be similarly sized.
While the possession of a large set of rights is a necessary condition
for an aggregating organization to be effective, there is no clear indication
of how large is large enough. Almost certainly, the necessary size to

215. See, e.g., MADDEN NFL 25 (EA Sports, PlayStation 3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox
One/iOS/Android CD-ROM 2013); GRAND THEFT AUTO V (Rockstar Games, Win./PlayStation
3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox One CD-ROM 2013); Brian Mazique, Building the Perfect
Football Game to Coexist with ‘Madden’, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2016, 9:53 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianmazique/2016/03/04/building-the-perfect-football-game-tocoexist-with-madden/#2140da837d30 [http://perma.cc/2E5M-2AD2].
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achieve efficient transactions will vary based on the nature of the
bargained-for rights of publicity. The more complete the set of rights is,
the better. But what constitutes a complete set will depend on the needs of
the developer. As a purely theoretical matter, it might be ideal to require
the organization to possess all rights needed by the creator of a qualified
creative work, but these needs will likely change from developer to
developer and work to work. Thus, it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to impose complete aggregation as a condition for exemption. Instead,
whatever threshold is set by statute, it must aim to optimize the number of
functional structures that would be included in the exemption’s purview
while minimizing the potential for opportunistic organizations attempting
to circumvent rather than complement the FCLRRP.
Whereas contemplation of the theoretical threshold for efficient
exchanges does little to suggest a firm number of rights which must be
aggregated by a qualifying organization, the political necessity of the
exemption is much more illuminating. If the major professional athletic
organizations in the United States—the NFL, NHL, MLB, and NBA—are
unable to qualify, any attempt to pass the act is doomed to fail.216 This
means that, at a maximum, the threshold must be set such that the number
of rights of publicity aggregated by these organizations is sufficient for
them to qualify. These organizations all have thirty teams,217 with the
exception of the NFL, which has thirty-two teams.218 The active roster
limits set by these leagues are twenty-three players for the NHL,219 fifteen
216. See Glenn McGraw, Which Pro Sport Generates The Most Revenue, FOX SPORTS
(May 14, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/buzzer/story/which-pro-sport-generates-themost-revenue-051414 [http://perma.cc/9QH9-SSTV] (Despite the growing importance of
professional soccer in the United States, it is not included in this list because its total revenue—
and lobbying ability—is still dwarfed by other major league sports. Moreover, the intellectual
property rights of U.S. soccer clubs tend to be organized on a team-by-team basis, rather than
league wide); see also Delegation of the United States, Roundtable on Competition and Sports, 70
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 n.4 (2010)
(demonstrating that many of these rights of publicity overlap with those held by international
organizations); Carolina Pina, The Role of IP for Athletes and Image Rights, GARRIGUES 1, 3
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/en/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14_t_11.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B4NA-UHKB] (raising questions about whether the MLS would be able to
generate the same efficient outcomes as seen with other major professional sports licensing).
217. Teams, NBA (2016), http://www.nba.com/teams/ [http://perma.cc/G3KU-7VPT];
Teams, NHL (2015), http://www.nhl.com/info/teams [http://perma.cc/BC94-PEAF]; Team-byTeam Information, MLB (2016), http://mlb.mlb.com/team/ [http://perma.cc/QGN4-3QR9].
218. Teams, NFL (2016), http://www.nfl.com/teams [http://perma.cc/28GB-3XFB].
219. Hockey Operations Guidelines, NHL (2015),
http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26377 [http://perma.cc/K8SW-VMUN].
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for the NBA,220 twenty-five for the MLB,221 and fifty-three for the NFL.222
Thus, the fewest rights of publicity controlled by any existing major
professional sports organization in the United States is the 450 players
licensable by the NBA.223
Given the absence of a compelling justification for setting the
threshold elsewhere and the holdup danger possessed when rights holders
are exempt from the compulsory system, the number of rights aggregated
required to qualify for exemption should be set at 450 likenesses.
Undoubtedly, this will be viewed as shameless pandering to the existing
interests of these organizations, but in the case of rights of publicity, it is
justified. In an otherwise failed system, these professional athletic
organizations have produced efficient and functional transactions, licensing
the rights to developers who in turn produce profitable products. This is
not a situation where the exclusion of these organizations represents a
government handout or indirect subsidy. The exclusion instead reflects the
recognition that the current system is not a complete failure and an
equitable provision that ensures the FCLRRP does not punish those
organizations that have been successful simply because others have not
been. It is also a precautionary measure that ensures that should the
FCLRRP fail to be efficient, functional, or practical, it at least leaves us no
worse off than under current law.
2. Registered.
Those organizations wishing to opt out of the compulsory regime will
need to register their organizations and the rights of publicity they hold
with a central government organization, much as copyrights and

220. Ira Winderman, Heat Down to NBA Limit With Five Cuts; Ennis Guarantee
Reworked, SUNSENTINEL (Oct. 24, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sports/miamiheat/sfl-miami-heat-nba-roster-s102415-story.html [http://perma.cc/DGJ6-LBRJ].
221. Arizona Phil, MLB Roster Rules, CUB REPORTER,
http://www.thecubreporter.com/book/export/html/3506 [http://perma.cc/7A4H-4DT4].
222. Mike Wobschall, Roster Rules Refresher: Practices Squad, IR, PUP, MINN.
VIKINGS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.vikings.com/news/article-1/Roster-Rules-RefresherPractices-Squad-IR-PUP/179442f4-7ce6-48e7-a112-441c3718b26e [http://perma.cc/HBD8RB2N].
223. Thirty teams with a roster of fifteen players would total 450 players, assuming no
additional contracted players are off the active rosters.
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trademarks are currently registered. Registration is an administrative but
important requirement. Under the FCLRRP, the ability to use compulsory
licensing to obtain the needed rights of publicity will be presumed, and
potential developers will need a way to search the contemplated rights to
ensure they are not exempt from compulsory licensing by virtue of being
held by a qualified aggregator. Such registration should be digitized to
facilitate the search and should include the contract information of the
registering organization to facilitate active bargaining for those rights.
3. Active.
Organizations wishing to be exempt from compulsory licensing must
be actively involved in licensing those rights. This requirement is
necessary lest the exemption for large rights aggregators become a
loophole by which individuals could opt out of the system and generate
precisely the inefficiencies the system sets out to solve. If an organization
was permitted to aggregate rights of publicity and then merely sit on them,
refusing to license them to any entity, an individual or other rights holder
could join the organization as a method of excluding him or herself from
compulsory licensing. Requiring that an organization have the genuine
intent of licensing its catalog of rights prevents this behavior.
This article rejects setting formal requirements or tests to determine if
an organization is actively engaged in licensing rights. Certainly, such
features could be contemplated. For example, Kunath’s proposal that each
rights holder be statutorily required to agree to a certain number of licenses
a year ensures that a rights holder—whether an aggregator or not—is
actively engaged in licensing the right(s) of publicity held. 224 Such
requirements, however, introduce their own problems that jeopardize the
administrability and efficiency of the system. How does one decide which
side—the licensor or licensee—is holding up negotiations? And if more
than one license is required, what of the gains from exclusivity discussed
above? Such requirements would, at the very least, also necessitate the
sanctioning of rate court proceedings comparable to those seen with
ASCAP to adjudicate situations where one or both sides feel a potential
licensing deal was not fairly reached. This, of course, would generate more
litigation, precisely what clear rules would be intended to prevent.
This is not to say that the vague, overarching language of being
actively engaged in the licensing of those rights would not also generate
224. Kunath, supra note 79, at 904.
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litigation. As a practical matter, this litigation would impact and deter
those organizations whose efficiency is dubious, while the existing frame
used by major professional athletic associations would survive. At worst,
the requirement would make it difficult for new rights aggregators to
establish themselves, but this is not necessarily bad. Exceptions should
remain exceptional. Imposing the requirement that organizations wishing
to opt out of the system prove active commercial use of their rights of
publicity comparable to that seen in the active licensing by current major
professional sports organizations would ensure the FCLRRP allows for the
acquisition of rights everywhere except where a truly vibrant and
functioning system exists.
E. Use of a Statutory Default Rate of 5% of Gross Revenue
This article expresses a preference for fair market dealings where they
can be simulated. As detailed above, when a single entity owns, or has
been assigned for negotiating purposes, a substantial number of rights of
publicity and is actively engaged in licensing those rights, the rate should
be negotiated between the developer and the rights aggregator. However, a
qualified rights aggregator will not always be present or have all the needed
rights of publicity for the developer’s current project. In these situations, a
default rate of 5% of gross revenue should be used to compensate all, or all
other, rights holders. A percentage of gross revenue rate structure aligns
the incentives of developers and rights holders and ensures that exorbitant
fees do not chill small developers seeking to exercise their constitutional
right to speech. While a wide range of default rates could be reasonably
argued for, this article finds that a rate of 5% best approximates that which
is found in comparable rights markets.
1. Use of a percentage of gross revenue fee structure.
This article proposes that the default rate at which the rights of
publicity are licensed be a percentage of gross revenue generated from the
sale of the work using the likenesses. While there are many other rate
structures seen in both the right of publicity context and in other
compulsory licensing schemes, using a percentage of gross revenue has a
number of advantages over all alternatives. Unlike a lump-sum fee or a
fixed fee per unit sold, a percentage of gross revenue at least loosely
rewards more famous persons commensurate with the added value of their
fame, accommodates the full range of income generation models seen in
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interactive entertainment, and ensures that small or individual developers
are not excluded from the market.
a. A percentage of a gross revenue model at least loosely rewards more
famous persons commensurate with the added value of their fame.
If we think a game title or other work’s success is influenced by the
fame of the persons whose likeness it portrays—which, to think a person
deserves compensation at all for their appearance in these works, we
must—then a revenue model should seek to compensate the individuals at
least somewhat proportionately with the demonstrated value of their fame.
Determining that precise value is a complex task that is discussed in more
detail in the distribution section of this article, but only a model based on a
percentage of revenue generates value at all commensurate with the
influence of the individuals depicted. If a lump-sum price were charged,
the value added by an individual’s fame would in no way be captured, as
any increased sales resulting from the person’s notoriety would not
translate into additional revenue for the rights holder. While a price-perunit model would reflect additional marginal sales with additional revenue
to the rights holder, it would not capture any increase in the viable sales
price for the product. For example, a developer might create two football
games using the same engine and mechanics systems, one simulating
college football and the other high school football. Both works would
qualify for federal compulsory licensing protection, but we might
realistically expect that the college football game might be able to
command a higher sales price because of its wider appeal and the
significantly greater notoriety of its players. Under either a per-unit or
lump-sum regime, there would be no corresponding additional
compensation to the college-level players even though their fame added
more value to the finished product.
b. A per-unit model cannot possibly accommodate the full range of income
generation models seen in interactive entertainment.
Video games draw on a wide range of revenue generation models.
Some developers sell licenses to their games in a traditional fashion that
mimics physical goods’ sales markets.225 These developers use physical
225. See, e.g., MADDEN NFL 25 (EA Sports, PlayStation 3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox
One/iOS/Andriod CD-ROM 2013); see also GRAND THEFT AUTO V (Rockstar Games,
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and digital retailers to sell their games for a fixed fee.226 But this model is
hardly ubiquitous in the industry. Historically, arcades have rented the use
of games and accompanying equipment by time or plays.227 While the
traditional arcade’s prevalence has faded in the twenty-first century, its
conceptual successors boom in the form of PC bangs, especially in foreign
markets like Korea.228 These PC bangs rent the use of high-performance
computers in dedicated centers, although they generally obtain their
licenses for the games themselves on a fixed-fee basis.229 Many online
games charge a monthly subscription fee to generate all or part of their
revenue230 and console manufacturers like Sony and Microsoft offer a
subscription service to access the multiplayer content of the games made
for their consoles.231 Increasingly, developers generate revenue through the
sale of optional add-on content, sometimes referred to as downloadable
content or DLC.232 This content can take the form of additional story
elements,233 power-ups for a player’s online avatar,234 or cosmetic
Win./PlayStation 3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox One CD-ROM 2013) (sold as whole games for
in-home gaming consoles).
226. See Joost van Dreunen, A Business History of Video Games: Revenue Models From
1980 to Today, COLUM. INST. FOR TELE-INFO. 1, 6–7 (2011).
227. Id.
228. Will Wei, What It’s Like Inside a ‘PC Bang’ in South Korea, TECHINSIDER (Oct. 18,
2015, 10:27 AM), http://www.techinsider.io/south-korea-gaming-pc-bang-2015-10
[http://perma.cc/4TV9-FPBE].
229. Cho Mu-Hyun, Nexon Halves Royalties From PC Bangs, KOREA TIMES (Mar. 22,
2013, 5:01 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2016/06/134_1322570.html
[http://perma.cc/Z85F-GNFL].
230. See van Dreunen, supra note 226, at 8–9.
231. See, e.g., MICROSOFT’S XBOX LIVE, http://www.xbox.com/en-US/live
[http://perma.cc/3ZGG-GJBB]; PlayStation Network, SONY (2016),
http://www.playstation.com/en-us/network/ [http://perma.cc/2X6L-EHB5].
232. See, e.g., Crusader Kings II, STEAM (2016),
http://store.steampowered.com/app/203770/ [http://perma.cc/W9PA-8HZW] (charging base game
prices of $39.99, but which has 58 pieces of “DLC” which can be purchased on Steam for a total
of $241.43 based on prices viewed on July 24, 2016).
233. See, e.g., THE WITCHER 3: WILD HUNT - BLOOD AND WINE (CD Projekt Red,
PlayStation 4/Xbox One/Win. CD-ROM 2016).
234. See, e.g., Gems, CLASH ROYALE WIKIA, http://clashroyale.wikia.com/wiki/Gems
[http://perma.cc/922B-JXN8].
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modifications to a player’s online image.235 Still, others use a combination
of the above models to generate revenue, for example charging a fixed fee
for a license to the base game, requiring a monthly subscription fee to play
the game, and also selling game expansions that unlock additional content
for a one-time fee.236 Unlike mechanical rights for songs that can be
realistically tied to physical or digital distribution of copies that can be
replayed on-demand, the methods of monetizing games vary too greatly for
a system that is dependent on sales, or any other monetization event, to
function. Instead, the system must bypass the monetization process, either
assigning a price at the outset in the form of a lump sum or at the end in the
form of a percentage of gross revenue.
c. Only a percentage-of-revenue model realistically allows for small or
individual developers to create games drawing on the likenesses of a large
number of persons.
A lump-sum model would require any developer seeking to take
advantage of a FCLRRP to front a large sum, excluding new and smaller
developers who could not afford the fee. While capital markets could
correct this problem, in theory, any lump-sum fee sufficiently large enough
to provide meaningful compensation to truly famous persons would also
likely put such rights out of the reach of new and unproven developers
without creditworthiness or assets to serve as collateral. A per-unit model
presents these same developers with a different problem: they are
effectively forced to set a minimum price for their works lest they lose
money per sale. An independent or individual developer, particularly a
new one, will realistically be equipped only to create shorter, less in-depth,
and ultimately lower priced, works. A meaningful per-unit price would
therefore likewise exclude them from the market.
A percentage of gross revenue model, on the other hand, encourages
innovation and risk taking. If the resulting game is a flop, the liability to
the licensee is limited by the work’s success. If it is a massive success,
those rewards are shared with rights holders, but a failure is never
compounded by the use of rights of publicity. In this way, a percentage of
gross revenue model encourages innovation and competition within the

235. See, e.g., Champion & Skin Sale: 09.09-09.12, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS,
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/news/store [http://perma.cc/W83L-LNH6].
236. See, e.g., WORLD OF WARCRAFT (Blizzard Entm’t, Mac/Win. Online 2004).
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entertainment industry, facilitating a robust industry and ultimately
generating more compensation for rights holders.
If a qualified rights aggregator exists, then that stakeholder is free to
negotiate a rate based on any metric, mitigating the risk that the statutory
default rate structure will make the creation of works commercially
unviable. Like the price itself, the rate structure could be modified during
any negotiations with a qualified rights aggregator. This means that if a
rate structure based on a percentage of revenue simply was not
commercially viable or optimal for a given work or class of works, the
parties could set a different one through the use of qualified rights
aggregators. For example, if a given work were going to be sold in a
traditional per-unit manner, the parties might prefer a flat fee per-unit to
avoid the disclosure and accounting required to determine the amount of
revenue the work generated. Perhaps a developer might be incentivized to
enter a new and risky genre—say, a Major League Ultimate (professional
Frisbee) simulator—by agreeing to pay a high royalty but only once sales
meet a minimum revenue generation threshold. The ability for the parties
to set a full range of royalty options when a qualified rights aggregator is
present means that the default rate structure need not be perfect, or even
functional, for every possible work: it must merely be practicable for most
of them. Among the rate structures seen in both the market and other
compulsory regimes, a percentage of revenue model best accomplishes that
purpose.
2. The compulsory rate should be set at 5% in light of the rates imposed by
other compulsory licensing systems, the rates found in comparable market
transactions, and other relevant considerations.
As is the case in any compulsory licensing regime, finding a
comparison rate that provides definitive guidance on whether a statutorily
imposed rate is reasonable is a difficult, often impossible, task. Still,
comparisons to other licensing markets, when taken together, can help
ensure that a compulsory licensing regime sets a reasonable rate in light of
the value added by the licensed rights. Below, this article reviews possible
sources of comparison and concludes that a rate of 5% would be a
reasonable default rate for a federal compulsory licensing regime for rights
of publicity.
a. Rates charged under existing compulsory licensing regimes.
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As noted above, a FCLRRP would not be the first compulsory
licensing regime for intellectual property rights in the United States. For
more than a decade, the Copyright Royalty Board has gone about the task
of determining what rates constitute fair market value under the
compulsory licensing regimes for performance rights and mechanical
rights.237 Because these rates reflect not just congressional and judicial
performance, but also the rates reached as a result of negotiations with
aggregating entities like ASCAP, they provide genuine insight into both the
market’s and the government’s view on what represents a fair rate for
intellectual property rights. Further, because the Federal Register also
published proposed rates,238 they are readily available for comparison in a
way that the current prices paid for rights of publicity by game developers
are not. For these reasons, the rates charged for these intellectual property
rights provide solid initial guidance on what an appropriate royalty rate
might be for a right of publicity.
i. Rates charged by ASCAP, the largest Performing Rights Organization.
The performance rights for copyrighted musical works are negotiated
by three Performing Rights Organizations, as explained in detail in Section
III. Of these three Performing Rights Organizations, ASCAP is the
largest.239 Due to recent litigation with Pandora,240 there is not only
accurate and up-to-date information on what these rates are but also a fresh
determination of the range of prices that are considered reasonable fair
market rates by the Copyright Royalty Board. ASCAP licenses the
performance right for its catalog of songs at a rate of 1.7% of gross revenue
to radio stations that are part of the Radio Music Licensing Committee
(“RMLC”).241 While ASCAP sought a substantially higher rate for
237. See generally Copyright Royalty & Distribution Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 1417,
108th Cong. (2004).
238. See, e.g., Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for Noncommercial
Broadcasting, 77 Fed. Reg. 24662, 24665–67 (proposed Apr. 25, 2012) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. 381).
239. See generally 2015 Annual Report, ASCAP 1 (2015),
http://www.ascap.com/about/annualreport.aspx [http://perma.cc/7QJT-CZ9G].
240. See generally In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
241. See id. at 326 (stating that the rate paid by RMLC to ASCAP is 1.7% for all its
stations, including digital retransmissions and iHeartRadio’s customizable experience).
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Pandora, arguing that the listener’s ability to customize radio stations
warranted a higher rate, the recent ruling by the Copyright Royalty Board
awarded ASCAP only a modest increase, setting the rate at 1.85%.242
Because copyrights on musical works are divided into six separate
categories, it is important to understand what right ASCAP is licensing to
accurately compare it to a publicity right. ASCAP’s right covers the
performance of a work, including broadcast performance, which, as
explained above, does not give a purchaser unlimited use of a song in any
form. ASCAP’s licenses cover “spinning” of tracks rather than outright
sales. The performance right for music is in many ways analogous to the
right of publicity, which covers the final representation of a person’s
likeness, not all, or even any, particular images depicting the same. Like
the uses contemplated by video game developers, the right of performance
is the right to use the underlying recognizable aspects of the property rather
than a precise replication of it.243 The creative works that have sparked
contemporary litigation, such as the NCAA football series, do not seek to
show precise recordings or photos of athletes; rather, they seek to use the
athlete’s likeness to allow customers to play out their own novel games
utilizing the developer’s engine. Like a band covering another artist’s song
in a live performance, the developers are seeking to invoke the notoriety
captured in the underlying right but are not seeking to replicate the talent or
ability of the right holder. And like the musician performing the live cover,
a developer contributes his or her own talents and style to create a new,
desirable experience for his or her audience. For this reason, the ASCAP
rates for performance rights provide a reasonable, if imperfect, benchmark
for a right of publicity royalty rate.
ii. Rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board for the mechanical rights to a
song or composition.
Another comparison from compulsory licensing regimes for music is
the rate set for the mechanical rights to a song. These rights are necessary
for a musician who, covering another’s song and recording it, wishes to
distribute copies of those covers. This rate is currently 9.10 cents per song
242. See id. at 353–57.
243. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977) (stating
that the First Amendment does not give a third party the right to appropriate a performer’s “entire
act”).
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sold.244 Figures on the average price paid for a distributed song are
impossible to gather, but accepting credible estimates that the average song
sold in the United States sells for $1.29 on iTunes, this implies a percentage
of gross revenue of 7%.245
The rate for mechanical rights probably presents an even closer
analogy to the rights of publicity sought by game companies than
performance rights since games are traditionally (although as addressed
above, by no means always) distributed as digital works, just like the songs
that carry mechanical licenses. Like recorded covers of other songs, a
developer using the likeness of others in an accurate way is capturing the
essence of the original while also imparting his own style, a right possessed
by those who cover, record, and distribute others’ songs. If artists may use
the lyrics of another’s song and then apply their own talent to create a
separate work and pay an effective rate of 7%, it does not seem
unreasonable that developers using the factual information and likeness of
real players should be allowed to sell their creative works for the same
effective fee.
iii. Regulatory rates governing interactive, on-demand streaming services
like Spotify.
Services that broadcast musical works to listeners on demand, like
Spotify, pay a rate codified at 10.5%.246 This rate includes both the
performance and mechanical rights. This rate may provide a reasonable
analogy, particularly for those works that rely on a robust multiplayer
network and developer-provided services for play. A player of the NCAA
football series can go online, select any team (and assorted players and
their likenesses), and play a game against an online opponent who has done
the same. This is roughly analogous to a person logging onto Spotify and
selecting the song he or she wants to hear. Moreover, if we view the
distribution of the game as analogous to the mechanical right, and the
display of the game to the player as analogous to a performance right, then
244. Dale Kawashima, An Overview of Mechanical Royalty Rates, SONGWRITER
UNIVERSE, http://www.songwriteruniverse.com/mechanical.html [http://perma.cc/67JM-Y8LC].
245. Sara Yin, iTunes Store Costs Apple $1.3 Billion Per Year?, PCMAG (June 14, 2011,
5:21 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386926,00.asp [http://perma.cc/69XC-796Z].
246. See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for
Making and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385.12(c) (2009).
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perhaps the rate that captures this rate jointly—i.e., the rate codified in 37
C.F.R. § 385.12247—is a good estimate for a default price under a federal
compulsory licensing regime for the right of publicity.
iv. Rates charged by SoundExchange for sound recordings.
Since 1995, sound recording copyright owners (“SRCOs”) have held
a digital performance right in the broadcasting or other performance of that
sound recording.
SoundExchange collects royalties from digital
broadcasters, like Pandora, and distributes them to SRCOs.248
SoundExchange’s rate structure is complicated, with different policies
based on broadcaster size and type.249 Licenses are a combination of lumpsum minimum fees, per-play fixed rates, and percentage of gross revenue
rates,250 making calculations of comparable effective rates difficult.
However, Pureplay Webcasters are charged a minimum of 25% of gross
revenue and Small Webcasters are charged a minimum of 10%.251 Because
larger broadcasters are charged a fixed per-play rate, a precise figure
cannot be calculated for them.252 However, a recent court decision noted
that Pandora pays over 50% of its gross revenue to SoundExchange.253
These figures suggest a much higher rate than do the comparisons to
other compulsory licenses. However, of the compulsory regimes for
musical copyrights addressed here, SoundExchange is easily the poorest
comparison to the use of publicity rights in video games and other creative
247. Id.
248. General FAQ, SOUNDEXCHANGE (2014),
http://www.soundexchange.com/about/general-faq/ [http://perma.cc/NS4F-E3B4].
249. 2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/serviceprovider/rates/ [http://perma.cc/3S9P-Z6DU].
250. See, e.g., Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/rates/commercial-webcaster
[http://perma.cc/EEN6-TA8E].
251. See Pureplay Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/pureplay-webcaster/
[http://perma.cc/TY49-KSM7]; see also Small Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE,
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/small-webcaster/
[http://perma.cc/K46K-QAHC].
252. See Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, supra note 250.
253. See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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works. These rates are charged for the performance of a specific digital
recording of a song, not the song itself. There is a clear analogy to the use
of images in games, but it is the developers who create and distribute the
specific digital reproductions of the person’s likeness; thus they, not the
rights holders, would be the ones collecting comparable fees. Just as it is
the record labels, not the songwriters and composers, who earn the revenue
from SoundExchange, if an equivalent right were established in the digital
replications contained in a game or other work, it would be the developer
who would collect the revenue. For this reason, while analogies can
appropriately be made between the licenses provided for other musical
rights and the license contemplated by a FCLRRP, the rate charged by
SoundExchange does not provide sensible guidance for setting a default
rate for rights of publicity.

b. Rates found in comparable market transactions.
Besides comparing the proposed rate to those that exist under existing
compulsory licensing regimes, it is sensible to compare this rate to existing
market transactions for these rights. In theory, such a comparison would
provide even more credible guidance than the above regimes, which deal
with copyrights for music rather than publicity rights for interactive
entertainment. However, in practice, such comparisons are difficult
because the lack of publicly available data means that assumptions must be
made that, if inaccurate, could result in widely inaccurate calculations. For
example, while total sales figures and release prices for video games are
publicly available, the average purchase price is not, meaning that
calculating gross revenue requires using a rough estimate of average sales
price. If these estimates are substantially different from the true figures,
then any estimates will be as well.
Further, license agreements for the right to create games using a
professional athletic organization’s intellectual property do not distinguish
(at least publicly) between the various intellectual property rights that are
being bundled.254 When Take-Two Interactive purchases the right to make
the NBA 2K series, they are purchasing not only the aggregated publicity
rights of the players, but also the trademark rights associated with the teams
254. 2013 Annual Report, TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE, INC. 1, 52,
http://ir.take2games.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=86428&p=irol-reportsAnnual [http://perma.cc/8V98JEWQ].
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and the organization, the organization’s endorsement of the game, and an
implicit fee for the aggregation of all these rights.255 Given the prominence
of trademarks associated with professional athletic teams, it is likely that
the bulk of the purchase price reflects the value of this right, as well as the
endorsement. In the case of the Madden series, this price also includes the
right to be the exclusive producers of an NFL video game.256 While this
article attempts to offset the value of these other rights based on publicly
available information concerning typical trademark licensing rates for these
organizations, these estimations introduce further opportunities for
inaccuracies.
This is not to say that these estimates provide no value. While the
estimates are almost certainly wrong, they are unlikely to have a substantial
impact. Even if we think that estimates might be twice or half what the
true figure is, the estimated rate still provides a minimum and maximum
bound for the fair market rate for rights of publicity. Moreover, if and
when Congress sets about the task of codifying a FCLRRP, interested
parties would be motivated to correct these estimates if they are grossly
incorrect. For example, if in actuality, EA’s sports games retail for an
average of $55 a unit, this would imply a substantially lower implied
percentage of gross revenue rate and it might then be motivated to provide
Congress with that information in the hopes that the default rate would be
set lower. In short, these estimates are the start of a discussion, not the end
of it and, until these estimates are correct, they provide a good-faith
estimate of what a fair market rate would be and where Congress should
peg a default price.
i. Estimated NBA 2K14 licensing rate as a percentage of gross revenue.
Take-Two Interactive licenses with the NBA for its NBA 2K series.257
Numbers for the license cost are not publicly available, but according to
Take-Two’s annual report, the company’s total expenditure for all licenses
in the 2013 fiscal year (the year NBA 2K14 was produced) was $57.3
255. Id.
256. Mike Florio, EA has Exclusive License from NFL for a “Couple More Years”, NBC
SPORTS (June 20, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/06/20/ea-hasexclusive-license-from-nfl-for-a-couple-more-years/ [http://perma.cc/N5SA-LEPW].
257. Owen S. Good, NBA 2K is Bigger than Madden Because it Paid for Others’
Failures, POLYGON (Feb. 15, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.polygon.com/2015/2/15/8043147/nba2k-is-bigger-than-madden-because-it-paid-for-others-failures [http://perma.cc/REH2-KUEC].
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million.258 This includes licenses for the company’s discontinued NHL and
MLB series, liabilities which some estimates put as high as $30 million.259
That said, to avoid basing any estimates on speculation, let us assume for
the moment that the entire $57.3 million went towards the NBA license,
realizing that this will mean our estimate will be too high, probably
substantially so. To date, NBA 2K14 has sold over 7 million copies.260
959,328 of those copies were sold in the first week of the game’s launch
(the PS4 and XboxOne releases corresponded with those system’s
releases).261 Assuming all units sold in the first week sold for a retail price
of $60 and that the remainder of games sold for an average of $45,
accounting for some full-price sales but also many sales at a deep discount
as the price fell over time, that means the game has grossed $329.4 million
to date. This implies an effective percentage of gross revenue rate of at
most 17.4% for the bundled right of publicity, trademark, and endorsement
rights. Now, consider that the standard royalty rate the NBA charges to
license their trademarks alone is 13%.262 This means that the implied rate
for the rights of publicity was at most 4.4%, and likely much lower. This is
suggestive of a rate comparable to rates ASCAP charges for its licenses.
ii. Estimated Madden NFL 25 licensing rate as a percentage of gross
revenue.
A credible estimate for the licensing rate charged by the NFL for the
exclusive right to produce an NFL video game is $50 million per year
(lump sum).263 To date, Madden NFL 25 (the 2014 release in the Madden
258. Annual Report 2013, supra note 254, at 39.
259. Good, supra note 257.
260. Evan Campbell, NBA 2K14 is the Best-Selling Sports Game Ever for Take-Two, IGN
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.ign.com/articles/2014/08/05/nba-2k14-is-the-best-selling-sportsgame-ever-for-take-two [http://perma.cc/8Q45-GQMH].
261. Global Weekly Chart, VGCHARTZ (Mar. 21, 2015),
http://www.vgchartz.com/weekly/42085/Global/ [http://perma.cc/NX3S-58Q3].
262. Scott Sillcox, Part 8-An Insider’s Guide to the World of Licensed Sports Products:
Royalty Rates, LICENSED SPORTS (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://licensedsports.blogspot.com/2012/03/insiders-guide-to-world-of-licensed_2802.html
[http://perma.cc/E78S-LNBH].
263. See John Gaudiosi, Madden: The $4 Billion Video Game Franchise, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 5, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/technology/innovation/madden-25/
[http://perma.cc/W9XK-J5DG].
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series) sold 5.14 million units worldwide.264 The release price for the game
was $59.99.265 For an AAA title, initial sales were slow, only moving a
million units in the first week.266 Assuming the initial million all sold for
$60 but the remainder sold for an average price of $45, factoring in some
sales at sticker price but also many well below it as the price dropped over
the year, that places total gross revenue for the game at $246.3 million.
This means that the effective percentage of gross revenue rate paid to the
NFL was 20.3%. Unlike the NBA, the NFL does not have a publicly
available standard licensing royalty rate. But if we assume it is comparable
to the NBA’s, as well as the NHL’s and MLB’s, which are 12%, that means
that after discounting the implicit rate for the trademarks, EA paid the NFL
7.3% of the game’s gross revenue for the rights of publicity of its players
and the exclusivity right. Ignoring the exclusivity premium entirely, this
suggests a rate comparable to the implicit rate charged for mechanical
rights under 37 C.F.R. § 385.12.
iii. Estimated Hart and Keller settlement agreement rate as a percentage of
gross revenue.
Using a settlement agreement to determine the effective royalty rate
carries with it a host of challenges, even exceeding those for the Madden
and NBA 2K14 licenses. Class action settlements are reached amongst a
storm of considerations, including the uncertainty and expense of trial, the
risk aversion of the class counsel and the defendant firm, and the lost timevalue of money that would result from a protracted trial and appeals
process.267 Still, most of these concerns cut both ways, encouraging both
parties to reach an agreement. It would be wrong to suggest that a class
action settlement necessarily favors either party, although there is certainly
264. Global Sales Per Game: Madden NFL 25, VGCHARTZ,
http://www.vgchartz.com/gamedb/?name=Madden+NFL+25&publisher=&platform=&genre=&
minSales=0&results=200 (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
265. Madden NFL 25, GAMESTOP, http://www.gamestop.com/ps4/games/madden-nfl25/109948 [http://perma.cc/JT7Q-LDAR].
266. Erik Kain, ‘Madden NFL 25’ Sales Down Over Last Year, First Week Still Tops 1M
Units, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013, 8:46 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2013/09/05/madden-nfl-25-down-over-last-year-still-top1m-units-first-week/#48ec06b47536 [http://perma.cc/TCG6-Y689].
267. See Brian W. Warwick, Note, Class Action Settlement Collusion: Let’s Not Sue
Class Counsel Quite Yet . . . ., 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 605, 606 (1999).
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some public sentiment that they favor defendants and class counsel over
actual victims.268 Moreover, while the NCAA class action settlement
agreement may seem a less accurate figure because of the additional
distorting motivations for reaching that figure, it also provides a direct
comparison. While the rates charged by professional athletic organizations
draw a good parallel to that which might be charged by amateur—but
nevertheless famous—athletes, the rate actually paid by them is even
better. This is particularly true because the settlement covers only rights of
publicity, unlike the above agreements which also cover trademark and
endorsement rights.
The approved settlement agreement in Keller and Hart (covering both
actions) obligates EA to establish a $40 million settlement fund.269 This
fund covers “[a]ny NCAA Division I football and men’s basketball player
who was listed on a roster published or issued by a school whose team was
included in a NCAA Branded Videogame originally published or
distributed from July 21, 2005 through September 3, 2014.”270 EA released
42 titles simulating either NCAA football or basketball during that time
period.271 These forty-two titles sold a total of 24.04 million units

268. See id. (“‘Collusion’ in the settlement of class action lawsuits refers to action taken
by lawyers representing a class to the detriment of the class members, but for the benefit of the
attorneys. Recently, numerous magazines and newspapers across the country have been quick to
add fuel to the fire raging against such abusive practices, particularly when settlements are
involved.”).
269. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with Defendant
Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
270. Id.
271. See Electronic Arts, IGN, http://www.ign.com/companies/electronic-arts
[http://perma.cc/2TA7-SDL4]. The titles, listed in descending order of sales, are: NCAA Football
06 (PS2), NCAA Football 07 (PS2), NCAA Football 13 (X360), NCAA Football 14 (X360),
NCAA Football 12 (X360), NCAA Football 06 (XB), NCAA Football 10 (X360), NCAA
Football 11 (X360), NCAA Football 13 (PS3), NCAA Football 11 (PS3), NCAA Football 10
(PS3), NCAA Football 12 (PS3), NCAA Football 08 (PS2), NCAA Football 14 (PS3), NCAA
Football 07 (X360), NCAA Football 09 (X360), NCAA Football 08 (X360), NCAA Football 09
(PS3), NCAA Football 10 (PS2), NCAA March Madness 07 (PS2), NCAA Football 07XB,
NCAA March Madness 06 (PS2), NCAA Football 09 (PS2), NCAA Football 2004 (XB), NCAA
Football 11 (PS2), NCAA Football 08 (PS3), NCAA Football 07 (PSP), NCAA Basketball 10
(PS3), NCAA Basketball 10 (X360), NCAA Basketball 09 (PS2), NCAA March Madness 08
(PS2), NCAA Football 09 (PSP), NCAA Basketball 09 (X360), NCAA March Madness 06 (XB),
NCAA March Madness 08 (X360), NCAA Football 10 (PSP), NCAA March Madness 07 (X360),
NCAA Football 09 All-Play (Wii), NCAA Basketball 09 (PS3), NCAA March Madness 08
(PS3), NCAA Football 08 (XB), and NCAA Basketball 09: March Madness Edition (X360).
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globally.272 Release prices for AAA games on major consoles have
remained relatively constant at $60 over the time period of the settlement,
although like more modern games, the price for all these titles dropped over
time.273 For this reason, this article assumes an average retail sale price per
unit of $45, which is consistent with the estimated price used for the
Madden NFL 25 and NBA 2K14 estimations. This estimate puts total gross
revenue for the combined sale of these titles at $1.082 billion and implies a
right of publicity royalty rate of 3.7% of gross revenue. This also suggests
a fair market rate above that charged by Performing Rights Organizations
but still below the regulatory rates for mechanical rights. It is also
comparable to any plausible estimate of the implied rate charged by the
NBA for the NBA 2K series.
c. Considerations of equity in setting a default rate.
Comparisons to existing rates in other compulsory licensing regimes
and in observed market transactions should be the principal guide for
setting a default rate. Doing so avoids both favoritism and arbitrariness.
The fair market value is, if nothing else, fair. That said, it is worth
mentioning a few equitable considerations. First, setting any rate and
creating an associated FCLRRP leaves athletes and other figures better off
than they were before. Under the current system, no matter how it is
interpreted, they will get nothing going forward. On the other hand, the
developers of these creative works have at least a plausible argument that
they are entitled on First Amendment grounds to produce the work without
seeking a license from anyone. If this is the case, any system leaves the
developers worse off. For this reason, there is less concern from an
equitable perspective about erring in favor of the developers than there is
about erring in favor of the rights holders when setting a rate.
Second, the right of publicity is a fundamentally less important right
than copyright, which is what all comparable compulsory licenses govern.
Without a right of publicity, our society would still have NCAA athletes,
272. Game Database: Global Sales of NCAA Games, VGCHARTZ,
http://www.vgchartz.com/gamedb/?name=NCAA [http://perma.cc/U2JX-ZQEU].
273. All but two of the forty-two titles were released on a major console and the two
releases on other platforms (the handheld PSP) also released for $60.00. In fact, the PSP games
still command a high price years later with NCAA Football 2010 for the PSP selling for $47.95
on Amazon. See NCAA Football 10-Sony PSP, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/NCAAFootball-10-Sony-PSP/dp/B001S86IRM [http://perma.cc/F69X-MMBC].
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politicians, and pop stars. Indeed, our country functioned until 1953
without such a right274 and to this day, twenty-one states do not recognize
the claim.275 It is a right that, while perhaps desirable, is not necessary. On
the other hand, without a functional copyright system, we would have
drastically fewer novels, films, shows, and video games. It is a right that
the United States Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to enforce.276
Seen from this perspective, ensuring that copyright holders receive
sufficient compensation under compulsory regimes is a task of vital
importance in promoting the continued production of creative works in this
country. Thus, it stands to reason that society, and the Copyright Royalty
Board specifically, would be comfortable setting and approving higher
royalty rates for copyrights than they would for rights of publicity.
Third, while the digital age has seen remarkable innovations in the
manner and quality in which music is transmitted, those who license
musical works are still fundamentally serving as a middleman, delivering
music from creators to listeners virtually unaltered. Without music,
services like Pandora and Spotify simply could not exist. Video game
developers, on the other hand, use the likenesses of real persons as just part
of the content on which their creative works draw. Without their
considerable talent and creativity, any production depicting real persons
would, at best, be characterized as a fact book. But while a game that
simulated a sport might be less appealing if it used randomly generated or
fictional players, it would still be a work of value to some consumers. As
Judge Bybee notes in his dissent in the case In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name and Likeness Licensing Litigation, even in the NCAA Football
series, there are enjoyable aspects of the game based entirely on fiction.277
While a player can control teams based on the team’s real-world
counterparts, users can also “enter[] ‘Dynasty’ mode, where the user . . .
recruits players from a randomly generated pool of high school athletes, or
‘Campus Legend’ mode, where the user controls a virtual player from high
school through college, making choices relating to practices, academics,
274. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953).
275. See generally THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, CAUSES OF ACTION FOR AN
INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (2016).
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
277. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268,
1271–72 (9th Cir. 2013).
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and social life.”278 Because developers take on the role of shaping rather
than merely transmitting content, and because their works could exist
outside the use of any person’s likeness, on the balance, it would seem that
relative to copyright holders, those who hold a right of publicity should be
compensated proportionately less for the compulsory use of these rights.
Fourth, requiring a license for the use of a person’s likeness creates a
chilling effect on speech. The Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled that
video games, like all forms of literature, are protected speech under the
First Amendment.279 The higher the required payment, the more that
speech is suppressed. For this reason, this article joins other scholars in
advocating that the requirement payment be reduced accordingly. In “The
Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in Calculating
Compensatory Damages,” Matthew Savare argues that ideally, works of
entertainment should have First Amendment protection from rights of
publicity claims, but that even if we do not provide them this protection
outright, courts should at least discount damage calculations by the
“percentage of the questionable speech that is transformative.”280 Because
the works covered by a FCLRRP will likely be wide-ranging, a default rate
would not be able to incorporate a precise percentage reduction, if one
could be calculated for an individual work at all. But this does not mean
free speech considerations should be cast aside. At the very least, any
default rate that would meaningfully deter a substantial amount of speech
should be strongly suspect.
All of these equitable considerations suggest that those who possess
rights of publicity should receive less compensation than the above
comparisons otherwise suggest.
d. All of the above suggest that a default rate of 5% would appropriately
compensate rights holders for the use of their likeness within a
nontransformative creative work.
Five percent is a reasonable default rate. As shown above, reasonable
comparisons, both from other compulsory regimes and from the market,
suggest an effective rate of between 1.7% and 10.5%. A rate of 5% sets the
278. Id.
279. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 786 (2011).
280. Matthew Savare, Comment, The Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in
Calculating Compensatory Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 185 (2004).
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rate at a level that is both within the range seen in compulsory licensing
regimes and between the estimated rate paid to the NBA and the NFL.
Because the estimates for these real-world royalty rates are both very likely
overestimates (because of the licensing price overestimate for the NBA
license and the exclusivity agreement tied into the NFL license), a rate of
5% is probably even on the high end when compared to the best available
real world comparisons. It is also higher than the implicit rate generated by
the Hart and Keller settlement. Still, given the ability of both rights
holders and developers to negotiate more appropriate (perhaps lower) rates
when a qualified rights aggregator can be established, the 5% figure
provides a workable baseline that will allow both developers to create
works and rights holders to be compensated in the event fair market
negotiations are not possible.
F. Distribution Structure
This article’s proposed FCLRRP separates the creation of a
distribution structure from the rate of payments. Whereas the rate of
payments concerns how much money is contributed to the pool of funds,
the distribution structure concerns how players will be compensated from
that pool. Unlike for the rate of compensation, where this article proposes
no court involvement or oversight—with rates either set by statute or
negotiated independently with qualified rights aggregators—issues of
distribution simply should not be left to such inflexible devices. The
creative works conceivably covered by this regime are wide ranging. Even
just considering our current conception of video games, it could cover
simulations of sporting events, military battles, political campaigns, and the
daily lives of the Hollywood elite.281 It would be foolhardy to create a
single distribution regime by statute or regulation for all these diverse
situations if we want to fairly compensate each right holder commensurate
with the contribution that the right holder actually made to the game or
other work.
281. Examples of video games that already wade into this area (whether or not they yet
use the precise likenesses of real people) are the “NCAA Football” series, the “Close Combat”
series, “President Forever 2016,” and “Kim Kardashian: Hollywood.” NCAA FOOTBALL SERIES
(EA Sports, PlayStation 3/Xbox 360 CD-ROM 2014); CLOSE COMBAT (Microsoft, Mac/Win.
CD-ROM 1996); PRESIDENT FOREVER 2016 (270soft, Mac/Win. Dwnld. 2016) (path:
http://270soft.com/us-election-games/president-election-game-2016/> Get it Now!> President
Infinity>Buy Now); KIM KARDASHIAN: HOLLYWOOD (Glu Mobile, Web
browser/Mac/iOS/Android Dwnld. 2014).
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Moreover, doing so would ignore the vast array of individual metrics
that may be available for a given work. Most titles with online multiplayer
capability—that is, most big releases—keep detailed metrics on player
activity.282 It is often possible to track play-time, team selection,
customization rates, win percentages, etcetera.283 Built with creating a
compensation structure in mind, these games could keep even more
detailed statistics that could be used to create a distribution based on the
actual, rather than purely theoretical, value that an individual’s likeness
contributed to the game. Any statutory or regulatory system would have to
appeal to the lowest common denominator of data available for any work.
Instead, it is better to have a system comparable to that found in the
compulsory regime for cable television retransmission rights or in class
action settlement agreements, where payments can be made in accordance
with the nature of the underlying rights holders and the available
information.
For the above reasons, and more discussed in detail below, this article
proposes that the distribution regime be governed as follows: once the pool
of collected royalties reaches a certain monetary value, the game developer
will propose a committee of experts. After a period for comment by rights
holders, the Copyright Royalty Board will approve or reject the proposed
committee. Once a committee is approved, the committee will set a
distribution regime in accordance with guiding principles meant to ensure a
fair and equitable distribution for rights holders. This proposed distribution
structure will be publicly filed and, after a period for comment by rights
holders, will be approved or rejected by the Copyright Royalty Board.
Once a distribution structure is approved, it will be administered in
accordance with its terms.
1. Need for a monetary trigger prior to appointment of the committee and
distribution of the fund.
Creating a distribution regime that fairly compensates rights holders
and administering that regime will carry costs, including the public expense
of court time. It is only sensible to go about a task when the benefits
outweigh the costs. Many creative works opting into this licensing regime
282. See Extra Credits, Extra Credits: Metrics, YOUTUBE (May 10, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqGcXOksFGg [http://perma.cc/FTQ4-C5NA].
283. Id.
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will ultimately generate trivial or nonexistent royalty funds from which
rights holders can draw. Requiring that a distribution regime be set only
after the fund is of a sufficient size helps ensure that the process is costjustified. This process is already used by existing compulsory licensing
regimes.284 For example, SoundExchange will delay, or withhold entirely,
payments to artists and publishers that do not meet certain specified
thresholds.285 A FCLRRP would be justified in doing the same.
This article proposes a minimum threshold to trigger committee
appointment of $200 per likeness depicted in the work or $200,000 total,
for works depicting over 1,000 likenesses, adjusted annually for inflation.
This is substantially above the minimum payout level of $10.00 that
SoundExchange requires for a distribution (although below the $250.00
level in which SoundExchange delays payments).286 And while it is above
ASCAP’s minimum payment thresholds, which are set at either $1.00 or
$100.00 depending on whether artists opt for electronic or physical
payment respectively, ASCAP requires members to pay a $50.00 fee to
even register, effectively imposing a minimum lifetime earnings of $50
prior to distribution.287 But unlike a work licensed under the FCLRRP,
SoundExchange and ASCAP already have a structure and system for
distribution in place. In contrast, a committee appointed by the FCLRRP
would not only need to distribute funds, but also design and implement the
infrastructure for such a distribution. While SoundExchange and ASCAP
both have much lower minimum payments, their total revenue volume is
far in excess of the $200,000.00 figure, allowing them to recoup the cost of
designing and implementing a distribution system.288 Requiring a $200 per
284. See General FAQ, supra note 248.
285. See id. (“SoundExchange offers a monthly royalty payment program for 1) those that
are signed up to receive electronic payments, 2) and have royalties due of at least $250. Artists
and labels that do not meet the minimum monthly threshold will continue to be paid on our
regular, quarterly schedule (March, June, September, and December) under the organization’s
existing guidelines. To receive a quarterly payment, you must have accrued at least $10 ($100 for
a paper check) in royalties before a scheduled distribution. If you are under the threshold,
SoundExchange will hold your royalties until you accrue enough royalties.”).
286. Id.
287. See Join ASCAP, ASCAP (2015), http://www.ascap.com/join/
[http://perma.cc/YJF3-NQF2].
288. In 2014, SoundExchange collected $774 million in fees. See Working With
SoundExchange, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/SX-Infographic_as-of-2.13.151.jpg [http://perma.cc/7UMR-V39Z].
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likeness minimum makes it more likely that any applicable fund will not be
entirely consumed by administrative expenses and will result in actual,
substantive payments to rights holders.
Moreover, in both compulsory licensing regimes and other areas of
law, there are monetary minimums which demonstrate a preference for
dealing with claims of meaningful value. While SoundExchange will
distribute payments to rights holders once they reach the $10.00 threshold,
an entity can only acquire the rights to SoundExchange’s catalog for a
minimum payment of $500.00.289 Similarly, while ASCAP rates vary by
the size and type of entity, the lowest advertised price on their website is
$365.00 a year (for individually owned cafés with occupancy under 50
persons).290 The law modifies or limits rights in other areas based on the
financial interest at stake, often with minimum thresholds far above those
suggested for a FCLRRP. For example, to obtain diversity jurisdiction, the
amount in controversy must be over $75,000.00291 and to qualify under the
Class Action Fairness Act, a class’s total claim must exceed
$5,000,000.00.292 In light of these figures, requiring a fund size of $200.00
per class member or $200,000.00 total is reasonable to ensure the system is
both efficient and generates meaningful returns to rights holders.
2. Committee composition.
The approved final committee will need to be composed of
individuals who are capable of designing an effective, fair, and equitable
distribution regime. Just as the nature of the works opting into a FCLRRP
will differ, so too will the distribution committee, who will represent an
array of skills and talents. However, this article identifies three skill sets
that will be necessary for any committee to possess if it is to effectively
design and administer a distribution structure: a person who is intimately
289. See Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, supra note 250.
290. Get an ASCAP Music License Restaurants, Bars & Grills, ASCAP (2015),
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/types/restaurant-bar-grill-tavern/restaurant-bar-grill-tavernindividual/restaurant-bar-grill-tavern-individual-a.aspx [http://perma.cc/PY3Z-PAJH].
291. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011).
292. See generally Jared R. Friedmann et al., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA):
Overview, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW 1,
http://www.cozen.com/Templates/media/files/ClassActionFairnessActof2005CAFA.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3LFU-MFQA].
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familiar with the work, statistics, and other metrics kept regarding it, a
person intimately familiar with the industry or activity in which the
depicted persons gained their notoriety, and a person familiar with the legal
rules surrounding compulsory licensing regimes and the FCLRRP in
particular. Additionally, this article outlines sensible requirements for
ensuring the committee maintains impartiality.
a. The need for a committee member who is intimately familiar with the
work, statistics, and other metrics.
One of the primary advantages of individually designing distribution
regimes for each work is that the regimes can use the full range of data
available from a given work to ensure the distribution is as fair and
efficient as possible. Without knowledge of the metrics available,
however, a committee can do nothing but resort to the basic and imprecise
metrics seen in the Keller settlement agreement.293 The requirement that
the developer appoint a member who has this familiarity and knowledge
will allow the committee to carry out its purpose. In theory, this could also
be accomplished by having the developer provide a comprehensive list and
guide for the metrics kept which would aid the committee. However, doing
so introduces the risk that the list is tailored to indicate preferred
distributions (i.e., to rights holders with whom the developer has other
business relationships). It would also introduce the possibility of undue
delay as the committee may ask for clarification and interpretation. Or
worse, a proposed regime might be impossible to implement due to a
misinterpretation regarding the metrics available to the committee.
Requiring the appointment of a member with this knowledge substantially
reduces these risks and ensures that if the final distribution structure is
unfair or inefficient, it is not because of a lack of knowledge of the
statistical capabilities available to the committee.
A developer will also be required to tender any data it gathers from
users of the licensed work if the committee ultimately deems it necessary to
generate the fairest and most efficient distribution possible. If deemed
appropriate by the Copyright Royalty Board, the actual data may be kept
under seal to protect trade secrets or confidential business information.
The nature of the data used and how it is used in calculating each right
holder’s share of the royalty pool will have to be public so that meaningful
293. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with Defendant
Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
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comments can be made prior to the Copyright Royalty Board approving the
distribution structure.
b. The need for a person intimately familiar with the industry or activity in
which the depicted persons gained their notoriety.
The right of publicity seeks to ensure compensation for individuals
when others use their likeness to harness their notoriety.294 It protects
against misappropriation of a person’s likeness so the person may receive
commercial value for it.295 To a large extent, the committee will implicitly
or explicitly set about the task of determining the commercial value of
individual likenesses relative to one another, which as noted above, is no
easy task. To do this in a nonarbitrary way, it is important that the
committee understand how the individuals depicted acquire and maintain
their fame and what draws consumers to some likenesses over others. As
large, comprehensive data sets on user activity continue to grow, the
importance of this aspect will grow less important as measurements of
actual desirability replace theoretical ones. But the committee will
ultimately have to make subjective judgments. For example, committees
will have to judge questions such as these: “How much does having an
historically accurate second string contribute to the consumer’s enjoyment
relative to just having the starting players be accurate?” or “In a political
campaign simulator where many players run Barack Obama’s campaign,
what is the value of being able to face his historically accurate opponents,
John McCain and Mitt Romney, rather than randomly generated, fictional
political opponents?” Without at least one member of the committee who
understands the underlying workings of the industry or activity in which
the depicted individuals engage, these judgments are less likely to reflect
the realities of the likeness’s publicity, and consequently, the fairness of the
distribution regime is jeopardized.
c. The need for a person familiar with the legal rules surrounding
compulsory licensing regimes, and the FCLRRP in particular.
As a legally mandated body subject to oversight and approval by the
Copyright Royalty Board, the committee will need to understand both the

294. BOGGESS, supra note 275, at 84.
295. Id.
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practical realities and options before it and its legal duties and obligations.
As case law develops over time, this role will grow in importance. To
ensure that the committee fully understands its duties and to ensure that any
proposal is unlikely to violate the statutory or common law requirements of
the FCLRRP, a member of the committee should be familiar with the
functioning of compulsory licensing in the United States and the
functioning of the FCLRRP in particular. Having such a person will also
foster communication between the Copyright Royalty Board and the
committee in the event the initial distribution proposal is rejected or
questioned.
d. General requirements for committee member appointment to ensure
impartiality.
If the distribution of collected royalties is to be fair, it is important
that the committee members be impartial. To facilitate this, this article
proposes two additional requirements in respect to an appointment: (1) no
committee member or their immediate family shall have any pecuniary
interest in the distribution; and (2) that less than half of the committee be
composed of employees of the developer.

i. No committee member or their immediate family shall have any
pecuniary interest in the distribution.
This limitation is fairly common sense. If members have a direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the distribution—for example, if they
are rights holders—this may influence how they structure the distribution.
Namely, such members will want to afford themselves favorable treatment.
In the case of a FCLRRP, this also means that those employed by an
organization that holds rights of publicity used in work cannot serve on the
committee; otherwise, they might be motivated to direct a disproportionate
distribution towards the set of rights held by their company. It is especially
important that representatives of organizations that license other
intellectual property (“IP”) rights be excluded from the committee. Since
developers pay for other IP rights, but are not financially impacted by the
distribution scheme, there is an obvious opportunity for collusion where the
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holder of multiple IP rights grants a lower price on the nonpublicity rights
in exchange for favorable treatment in regard to distribution, resulting in
increased profits for the developer and certain rights holder at the expense
of other rights holders. Even without an explicit quid pro quo, there would
be a strong incentive for any employees of the developer to cede to their
business partner’s wishes in the distribution phase.
Preventing
stakeholders or their agents from serving on the committee reduces the
likelihood of such self-interested behavior.
ii. Less than half of the committee shall be composed of employees of the
developer.
As explained above, there is a natural opportunity for those with
existing business relationships with developers to collude at the distribution
stage of the FCLRRP. Even if there is no stakeholder who engages in other
transactions with the licensee, the distribution should reflect a theoretical
fair market, not the whims of the developer. For this reason, a majority of
the committee should be independent third parties rather than current or
recent employees of the developer. Employees of the developers should
not be excluded entirely—they likely hold valuable information as to the
metrics available to the committee and may also provide insight into the
developer’s customer base. Mandating that third parties comprise a
majority of the committee means that developers will not be able to force
their wishes on rights holders without convincing independent entities that
the proposed distribution is fair and equitable.
3. Committee compensation and administration expenses.
Committee members will need to be paid a reasonable wage and there
will likely be other expenses associated with distributing compensation to
rights holders. When the Copyright Royalty Board considers a proposed
distribution committee, it will consider the proposed compensation for the
proposed members as part of that determination. While the Copyright
Royalty Board can serve as a check on the reasonableness of any fees
charged, a FCLRRP should lay out who will bear these expenses. How
these expenses are allocated influences the incentives of both the developer
(in respect to who is appointed and how well the committee is paid), and
the rights holders (in regard to their expressed preferences in the form of
comments and challenges at the approval stages). To best align these
incentives with the goal of creating a fair and efficient system, this article
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proposes that administrative costs be taken out of the fund directly, that the
salaries for any committee members who are current or recent employees
be borne by the developer, and that compensation for third-party committee
members be borne primarily by the royalty fund with partial payments from
the developer at high salary ranges.
a. Administrative expenses borne by the royalty fund.
Increasing precision increases cost. One of the issues a committee
will have to grapple with is how to fairly distribute royalties to rights
holders while also ensuring that the administration of that distribution does
not swallow most, or all, of the fund, resulting in low compensation for
members in real terms. If the developer bore the administration cost even
in part, rights holders would be incentivized to demand a higher level of
precision in determining distribution amounts than might be cost-justified.
By taking these expenses out of the fund, as SoundExchange does in
distributing royalties to its rights holders,296 rights holders will need to
balance the desire for a comprehensive distribution structure with the desire
to limit administrative expenses. Further, there is little reason to think that
the committee, even those employed by the developer, would have an
interest in seeing the fund go to administrative expenses rather than rights
holders. If anything, they would seek to generate goodwill with rights
holders, which would incentivize them to reduce these costs. For these
reasons, the cost of administering the distribution will be borne by the fund.
b. Committee members who are current or recent employees of the
developer will be compensated by the developer.
If employees of the developer are compensated by the fund even in
part, there would be an incentive for the developer to pay them a high
salary, rewarding them for past and future service without bearing the full
cost of that compensation. Moreover, the FCLRRP is designed to transfer
funds from developers to rights holders in exchange for the value that the
rights holders generate. If developers could then recover that money by
appointing their employees to the committee, it would create the perception
that that purpose was being thwarted. This must be weighed against the
risk that developers will be reluctant to nominate qualified employees for
the committee if they bear the full cost since the developer receives no
296. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2010).
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direct benefit from appointing a competent committee member. This
incentive is somewhat cabined by the fact that they are obligated, as a
condition of opting into the FCLRRP, to provide at least one committee
member with intimate knowledge of the creative work.
Additionally, because the developer still bears a portion of the
expenses for third-party committee members,297 there will be instances in
which the developer will choose to appoint an employee when doing so is
vastly more cost-efficient than a third-party alternative. For example, a
developer would still prefer to appoint in-house counsel familiar with
compulsory licensing regimes who was paid $50 an hour over a lawyer
from a large law firm who was familiar with the same but charges $600 an
hour. Given the above concerns with direct payment of developer
employees, any committee member who is a current or recent employee of
the developer shall be compensated entirely by the developer.
c. Committee members who are not current or recent employees of the
developer will be compensated by the royalty fund up to a reasonable cap,
after which the developer will compensate them.
Aligning the incentives for the payment of third-party committee
members is a difficult task. On the one hand, if the developer bears the
entire cost or even part of it, he or she will appoint the cheapest individuals
to serve on the committee. Because the fund is only distributed to rights
holders, the developer has no direct interest in ensuring that a distribution
plan is fair or efficient and, in turn, no incentive to ensure the committee
members are effective and competent. On the other hand, if the fund bears
the entire cost, developers may appoint overqualified individuals or appoint
members based on nepotistic considerations. While the Copyright Royalty
Board can serve as a check against the appointment of overqualified or
simply overpriced committee members, ideally the cost structure would
also motivate the developer to make appropriate appointments. Based on
these considerations, the full cost of third-party committee members will be
deducted from the royalty fund up to 2% of the fund’s value, thereby
eliminating the incentive for a developer to select only the most cost
effective members. To the extent total compensation exceeds 2% of the
fund’s total value, the fund will bear 90% of the cost and the developer will
bear 10%, creating an upward bound check on the cost of committee
members without eviscerating the incentive for developers to appoint well297. See infra Section V.F.4.a–b.
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qualified individuals to ensure a fair and efficient distribution regime will
be created.
4. Guiding principles for constructing a distribution structure.
While the hallmark of the FCLRRP’s distribution structure is
flexibility, allowing the regime to apply to the full range of creative works
currently in existence and yet to come, the committee will need guidance in
designing an effective regime. One might think of dozens of principles that
could be codified in a FCLRRP to help guide the committee. Or one might
favor no legislative directive in this regard, allowing instead for a robust
case law to develop over time and serve that function. This article neither
advocates a particular position on how these principles will be best enacted
nor outlines a complete list of what those principles should be. This
section does, however, suggest some concepts that might reasonably serve
as a starting place for committees faced with the task of developing a
distribution structure.
a. The committee should favor distribution based on demonstrated value
rather than theoretical calculations of a likeness’s worth.
The amount of data collected by modern day developers on the use of
their games is mind-boggling. For example, a multiplayer first-person
shooter will track the number of games played, number of games won, how
often and for how long players use given weapons, characters, special
abilities and other games features, whether a player uses an audio headset,
whether, how, and how often he or she communicates with other players,
whether and how often he or she mutes other players, who he or she plays
with and for how long, etcetera.298 In other areas of law and in academia, a
resort to theoretical or derivative models is the first and only resort. But
this need not be the case under a FCLRRP. The value of a given depiction
can be very closely approximated or determined by the actual consumer
experience. Persons whose avatars are played more can be compensated
more. This does not remove subjective calculations. For example, the
committee will still need to decide relative valuation questions. For
example, how to value the avatars the player selects to play versus the
avatars he seeks to play against versus the avatars and likenesses that are
incidentally or randomly presented. But this data does mean guesswork
298. See Extra Credits, supra note 282.
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can be largely eliminated.
b. The committee should favor the establishment of a fixed distribution
ratio after the qualified creative work has been released for a year.
The wide availability of precise and massive data on player usage
might tempt a committee to fluctuate the distribution over time as use
fluctuates. It might seem sensible to distribute any revenues with current
usage similar to the music industry model. The problem is, unlike in the
music industry, fees are not collected by use but rather as a percentage of
gross revenue for the qualified creative work. For works using a traditional
AAA video game revenue generation model, the revenue will be very
frontloaded and may also spike as additional downloadable content is
released. Under a current usage model, revenue would be distributed
disproportionately to those people whose likeness is used early on by
purchasers or otherwise used in the months that revenue spikes occurred.
This process will not only inaccurately depict the value the player
gets from the array of depicted likenesses, it will favor established, known
persons. A new player may select a famous team or player to start his
game. Later, in an effort to up the challenge of the game or simply explore
the work more deeply, the player may start selecting lesser-known avatars.
The ability to replay the game over and over as novel characters was part of
the value captured in the initial purchase price, but may not be
demonstrated until months later. Thus, the committee should not pursue
distribution until an adequate sample of consumer usage data can be
captured.
Of course, if the committee waited until the full life-cycle of the game
expired, a process that could take a decade or more, the rights holders
would be denied timely and relevant distributions. Further, while the data
available to developers today is unfathomably large, its collection has a
cost. Often, this cost is very low, but if a distribution structure mandates
payments based on this data, the developer would need to continue to
collect the data, perhaps for long after it was profitable for the company to
do so. Both of these concerns suggest that there needs to be a timely end
date to the collection of metrics for distributions.
This article suggests that this time period be a year from the games
release, at which point additional distributions from additional revenue (if
any) will be made in the same proportion as the original distribution. This
provides enough time to gather data on player usage over a substantial
period of play without burdening the developer with a long time period to
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guarantee metric collection. A year should also be long enough for the
committee to structure the system in the event there is protracted debate or
comments in opposition to the proposed distribution plan. There is nothing
that necessitates a year over any other viable time frame, but it seems a
sensible time horizon for a committee to aim for, balancing both the
interest in collecting a complete and representative data set and the interest
of distributing the funds in a timely manner.
c. The committee need not locate every rights holder, but for those not
located, his or her distribution should be held for a substantial period of
time in case he or she emerges to claim it.
Because administrative expenses will be borne entirely by the fund,
expenses associated with locating and notifying rights holders will
necessarily mean a lower total distribution to the group. While class action
jurisprudence favors delivering actual notice to all potential claimants and,
barring that, providing constructive notice through publication, this article
eschews those preferences in the FCLRRP context. Instead, distributions
should be made automatically to any rights holder for whom sufficient
information is available and when that information is unavailable, the
establishment of a website allowing depicted persons to register and claim
their funds should be sufficient.
When sufficient information is available, distributions should be
made without requiring registration or notice to individual rights holders.
Often, this information is available. As game series develop, many of the
persons depicted will likely remain the same year to year and the previous
information acquired for the distribution of funds can be used again. While
the developer is unlikely to have all the necessary information, there is no
sound reason that it needs all of this information for the system to operate
effectively. Payments that can be made should be made.
For those rights holders who cannot have a payment automatically
transferred to them because of a lack of information, a claims website
where the rights holders can register and receive electronic payments
should be established.
Both ASCAP and SoundExchange require
registration from their members and require providing the information
required for electronic transfer to take advantage of a lower minimum
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threshold for distribution.299 When necessary to pay administrative costs,
these organizations may even appropriate funds from old, unclaimed
accounts, essentially causing an artist who is not proactive in registering to
forfeit compensation.300
Many areas of law favor those who actively monitor and enforce their
rights. This preference is demonstrated in the availability of statutes of
limitations and laches defenses.301 While the precise nature of the right of
publicity varies from state to state, both statutes of limitations and laches
defenses have been applied to right of publicity claims in some states.302
These defenses are also found in the commensurate intellectual property
rights of copyright and trademarks.303 Given the preference for the
affirmative assertion of rights of publicity and comparable intellectual
property rights under compulsory licensing regimes, committees should not
prioritize outreach to rights holders.
This is not to say the claims of those who do not register quickly
should be entirely forfeited, as they often are in the class action context.
Because the full set of rights of publicity depicted are known to the
committee, there is no need to impose deadlines in an effort to determine
the class size or composition. Compensation can (and should) also be
calculated with no input from the rights holders, so the use of a deadline as
a tool for the expedient release of information is also unnecessary in the
FCLRRP context. Unlike many areas of the law, there is no need for a
statute of limitations defense or laches defense to prevent surprise to a
defendant. Since the developer will already be opting into the system, it
will be aware of its liability from the outset. Given these differences,
299. See Direct Deposit and Royalty Thresholds, ASCAP (2015),
http://ascap.com/members/payment/payment.aspx [http://perma.cc/4SDW-53QK]; see also
General FAQ, supra note 248.
300. General FAQ, supra note 248.
301. Blair v. Nev. Landing P’ship, 859 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
302. See id. at 1192 (dismissing a right of publicity case with prejudice because it was
brought outside the statute of limitations); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v.
Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding a defense of laches was a triable
issue of fact for the jury in a right of publicity suit).
303. See Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985) (barring a
trademark claim after a ten-week delay under a laches theory). But see Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1972 (2014) (ruling that the clearly defined statute of
limitations for copyrights renders the laches defense inapplicable to copyright claims); see also
Robert C. Scheinfeld, Laches in Trademark Infringement: How Long Can You Sleep on Rights?,
251 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (2014).
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payments should simply be held until they are claimed. While a committee
need not waste royalty funds searching for missing rights holders, there is
little reason to penalize them for their delay.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FCLRRP laid out in this article is a comprehensive proposal for a
concrete problem. Undoubtedly, it is imperfect. But the perfect need not
be the enemy of the good. The precedents set by Hart and Keller mean that
until there is a change in the law, video games that are desired by
consumers and potentially profitable to developers and rights holders alike
will not be produced. This article’s compulsory regime would not only
leave all parties better off but would also better effectuate the principles
that underlie rights of publicity laws. It does not reassign rights: it
facilitates their exchange. And while it may not be the only solution, it is
the only one to date that proposes a change in the law that goes beyond
simply legislating one of Hart and Keller’s dichotomous outcomes and
further presents a detailed, fully actionable regime that fosters the
production of creative works.

